Results 31 to 40 of about 109 (102)

Unveiling the nature of philosophical problems: Formal and conceptual aspects

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 17-34, January 2025.
Abstract This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non‐philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics.
Jens Harbecke
wiley   +1 more source

The Liar Paradox in Plato [PDF]

Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy, 2015
Although most scholars trace the Liar Paradox to Plato’s contemporary, Eubulides, the paper argues that Plato builds something very like the Liar Paradox into the very structure of his dialogues with significant consequences for understanding his views ...
Richard McDonough
doaj  

The value of incoherence

Philosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 37-58, October 2024.
Abstract I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy.
Claire Field
wiley   +1 more source

Incapability or Contradiction? Deguchi’s Self-as-We in Light of Nishida’s Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity

Open Philosophy
Deguchi’s Self-as-We aims to vindicate a holistic conception of self by working out the implications of what it is to be an agent in light of the East Asian tradition.
Sawada Jun, Takagi Shunichi
doaj   +1 more source

The sting of negativity: Irad Kimhi and Michael Della Rocca on the Parmenidean challenge

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 32, Issue 2, Page 577-595, June 2024.
Abstract Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment ...
Anton Friedrich Koch
wiley   +1 more source

Why and how to be a Dialetheist

Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2008
In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating.
Manuel Bremer
doaj  

What is this thing called dialetheism?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
This paper has two parts. In the first I discuss two claims made by Priest in Some Comments and Replies (DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3 27, 2019): (i) that the idea of ‘contradictions in reality’ lacks textual support in his work, and (ii) that such ...
Abilio Rodrigues
doaj   +1 more source

Being Is a Being

Open Philosophy
Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap.
Czerkawski Maciej
doaj   +1 more source

Validity, dialetheism and self-reference [PDF]

Synthese, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +2 more sources

Overinterpreting Logics

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Paraconsistent logics, minimally, are not explosive; that is, on these logics, not everything follows from a contradiction of the form ‘A and not-A’.
Otávio Bueno
doaj   +1 more source