Results 101 to 110 of about 1,066 (119)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense

Dialogue, 2015
The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e ...
openaire   +1 more source

Descartes and the Question of Direct Doxastic Voluntarism

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2010
In this paper, I clarify Descartes' account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims.
openaire   +1 more source

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations

Erkenntnis, 2011
Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will.
openaire   +1 more source

Overlapping consensus: normative understanding and doxastic voluntarism

Croatian journal of philosophy, 2009
Rawls' idea of overlapping consensus is crucial for the public justification of a political conception of justice in modern democratic societies. While overlapping consensus is mostly understood empirically, in the first part of this article we argue that a normative interpretation is more appropriate.
Zelič, Nebojša   +1 more
openaire   +1 more source

Implications of the Debate on Doxastic Voluntarism for W. K. Clifford’s Ethics of Belief

2020
One of the most controversial positions in the debate on an ethics of belief is the position of William Kingdon Clifford, who argues for the evidentialist principle that one should never believe upon insufficient evidence. Clifford’s position differs from most contemporary evidentialist approaches in that he takes this principle to be a moral norm ...
openaire   +1 more source

Doxastic voluntarism and the libertarian notion of freedom

2008
In this paper I'll try to show the main problems that emerged in the discussion regarding the plausibility of doxastic voluntarism and it’ s applicability in the realm of the deontology of belief. In the first part of the paper I’ ll briefly illustrate why should we regard the thesis of doxastic voluntarism as an important one for the ...
openaire  

The Limits of Doxastic Voluntarism

Philosophical Inquiry, 1985
openaire   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy