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A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism
NoûsAbstractDoxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves.
Laura K Soter
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Descartes’ Doxastic Voluntarism
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2013openaire +3 more sources
Why Every Belief is a Choice: Descartes’ Doxastic Voluntarism Reconsidered
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2023openaire +3 more sources
2023
Could you form some belief for a prize when you have no evidence supporting it? Say, the belief that all intelligent lifeforms in the Andromeda Galaxy are tripods? Could you immediately make yourself form some belief, which you know to be false, say, the belief that the present king of England rules the United States? Obviously not.
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Could you form some belief for a prize when you have no evidence supporting it? Say, the belief that all intelligent lifeforms in the Andromeda Galaxy are tripods? Could you immediately make yourself form some belief, which you know to be false, say, the belief that the present king of England rules the United States? Obviously not.
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Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2013Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus ...
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Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2019According to the view Rik Peels defends in Responsible Belief (2017), one is responsible for believing something only if that belief was the result of choices one made voluntarily, and for which one may be held responsible. Here, I argue against this voluntarist account of doxastic responsibility and in favor of the rationalist position that a person ...
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief
Facta Philosophica, 1999Abstract Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. According to the writer, belief formation is not causing oneself to believe something, but simply a belief's forming. How, then, can
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