Results 71 to 80 of about 1,066 (119)
The complementarity of mindshaping and mindreading [PDF]
, 2019 Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people?
Peters, Uwe
core
Polytheism and the Euthyphro [PDF]
, 2016 In this reading of the Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro are seen less in a primordial conflict between reason and devotion, than as sincere Hellenic polytheists engaged in an inquiry based upon a common intuition that, in addition to the irreducible ...
Butler, Edward P.
core
Neural and Environmental Modulation of Motivation: What's the Moral Difference? [PDF]
, 2018 Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually.
Douglas, Thomas
core
Belief, Credence, and Faith [PDF]
, 2019 In this article, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C ...
Jackson, Elizabeth
core
, 2019 This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view.
Hughes, Nick
core
Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition [PDF]
, 2016 One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated.
Godden, David
core
From self-deception to self-control [PDF]
, 2014 ‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false.
Correia, Vasco
core
Room for responsibility: Kant on direct doxastic voluntarism
InquiryKant's theory of assent seems to combine two incompatible claims that (i) we are responsible for our assent and (ii) we have no direct voluntary control over our assent. But how can we be responsible for something over which we have no direct voluntary control?
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability [PDF]
, 2018 Everyone agrees that not all norms that govern belief and assertion are epistemic. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others.
Kauppinen, Antti
core
Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality. [PDF]
Rev Philos Psychol, 2017 Petersson B.
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