Results 61 to 70 of about 1,066 (119)

If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It [PDF]

, 2020
I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their ...
Helton, Grace
core  

On the Automaticity and Ethics of Belief [PDF]

, 2017
Recently, philosophers have appealed to empirical studies to argue that whenever we think that p, we automatically believe that p (Millikan 2004; Mandelbaum 2014; Levy and Mandelbaum 2014).
Peters, Uwe
core  

Introduction: Examined Live – An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection [PDF]

, 2019
Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of “reflective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life.
A Goldman, A Gürtner, B Frances, C Korsgaard, C Korsgaard, D Christensen, D Dunning, D Kahneman, E Mayr, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, E Sosa, F Brentano, H Battaly, H Frankfurt, H Frankfurt, H Kornblith, H Kornblith, H Procee, HJ Hermans, I Marková, ICM Seggelen–Damen Van, J Baehr, J Greco, J Livengood, J Matheson, J McDowell, J Proust, J Skorupski, J Valsiner, J Valsiner, JL Kvanvig, JM Doris, K Mann, L Bonjour, L Tateo, LT Zagzebski, M Vähämaa, M Woerkom Van, P Engel, P Hieronymi, PD Trapnell, Plato, R Feldman, RM Chisholm, RM Chisholm, T Burkart, T Nagel, T Sato, V Tiberius, W Ransome, WJ Silva Filho   +56 more
core   +1 more source

Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability. [PDF]

Topoi (Dordr), 2021
Howes M, Hundleby C.
europepmc   +1 more source

Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) [PDF]

, 2019
It is often assumed that believing that p for a normative reason consists in nothing more than (i) believing that p for a reason and (ii) that reason’s corresponding to a normative reason to believe that p, where (i) and (ii) are independent factors ...
Lord, Errol, Sylvan, Kurt
core   +1 more source

Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend's metaphilosophy. [PDF]

Synthese, 2021
Kuby D.
europepmc   +1 more source

What we know when we act. [PDF]

Philos Stud, 2023
Kearl T.
europepmc   +1 more source

The illusion of discretion [PDF]

, 2015
Recent writers have invoked the idea that epistemic rationality gives us options in an attempt to show that we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality.
Sylvan, Kurt
core   +1 more source

A paradigm-based explanation of trust. [PDF]

Synthese, 2023
Bieber F, Viehoff J.
europepmc   +1 more source

Doxastic deontology without doxastic voluntarism

, 2010
This presentation is part of the Ethical and Epistemic Choices: New Approaches track. It is commonplace for epistemologists to reject doxastic voluntarism, the thesis that persons can form beliefs voluntarily. To the philosophically uninitiated, though, this rejection can sound preposterous. Epistemologists who reject doxastic voluntarism sound as if
openaire   +1 more source