Results 41 to 50 of about 1,066 (119)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 3, Page 874-896, November 2024.Abstract This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence.
Joost Ziff
wiley +1 more source
A Case for Epistemic Agency [PDF]
, 2015 This paper attempts to answer two questions: What is epistemic agency? And what are the motivations for having this concept? In response to the first question, it is argued that epistemic agency is the agency one has over one’s belief-forming practices ...
Olson, Dustin
core +1 more source
Indirect evaluative voluntarism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 3, Page 1009-1031, November 2024.Abstract Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism.
Alex Horne
wiley +1 more source
Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind [PDF]
, 2020 This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity.
Schmidt, Sebastian
core
Trust in the guise of belief [PDF]
, 2018 What kind of mental state is trust? It seems to have features that can lead one to think that it is a doxastic state (cf. Adler 1994, Baier 1986, Hieronymi 2008, Keren 2014, McMyler 2011) but also features that can lead one to think that it is a non ...
Booth, Anthony Robert
core +1 more source
Mental agency and rational subjectivity
European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 32, Issue 1, Page 224-245, March 2024.Abstract Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility ...
Lucy Campbell, Alexander Greenberg
wiley +1 more source
Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism [PDF]
, 2011 According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it.
Côté-Bouchard, Charles
core
Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality [PDF]
, 2019 This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses.
Alchourrón C. +40 more
core +1 more source
Truth, Communication, and Democracy
International Journal of Communication, 2019 This article argues that truth is vital to deliberative democracy and to communication as an academic discipline. Our definition of truth is critical realist in nature—that is, it refers to an ontologically objective reality.
Douglas Porpora, Seif Sekalala
doaj
Why responsible belief is blameless belief [PDF]
, 2010 No description ...
Booth, Anthony Robert, Peels, Rik
core +2 more sources