Results 21 to 30 of about 9,408 (70)

Justification and Inquiry: Resolving the Easy Knowledge Problem

Theoria, Volume 91, Issue 5, October 2025.
ABSTRACT Bootstrapping and the easy knowledge problem can be understood as puzzles about conflicting intuitions. On one hand, each step of the inference seems correct, but on the other, the overall process seems unacceptable. These puzzles will be resolved by establishing two distinctions.
Guido Melchior
wiley   +1 more source

Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]

In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in ...
Odoj, Ewa
core   +1 more source

Putting Racism Back in the Head

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 3, Page 218-228, Summer 2025.
ABSTRACT Personal racism used to be widely considered a kind of cognitive defect, with racists being people with biased, irrational racial attitudes. This kind of epistemic “racism‐in‐the‐head” view has fallen largely out of favor in recent decades.
Jordan Scott
wiley   +1 more source

Divergence Arguments in Collective Epistemology

Philosophy Compass, Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2025.
ABSTRACT Many have argued that the lives of groups and their members may diverge. For example, that groups can believe or know propositions that none of their members know or believe. This article gives an overview of a prominent type of argument, called divergence argument, which aims to support this view.
Simon Graf, Haixin Dang
wiley   +1 more source

Hoping on insufficient evidence: how epistemically rational can action‐centred faith be?

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 66, Issue 3, Page 238-252, May 2025.
Abstract Daniel McKaughan has recently argued that conceiving faith as an ‘action‐centred’ attitude whose cognitive component falls short of outright belief can play a central role in explaining how people who regard the truth of Christianity as significantly less probable than naturalism can respond with faith to the gospel proclamation without ...
Giorgio Volpe
wiley   +1 more source

How to make up your mind

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 3, Page 874-896, November 2024.
Abstract This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence.
Joost Ziff
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemic justification as a normative concept [PDF]

, 2005
There is a way of talking about epistemic justification that involves the notion of our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply with makes us blameworthy, called the deontological conception.
Booth, Anthony Robert
core  

Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief

, 2017
Pragmatists have argued that doxastic or epistemic norms do not apply to beliefs, but to changes of beliefs; thus not to the holding or not-holding, but to the acquisition or removal of beliefs.
Rott, Hans, Hans Rott
core   +1 more source

An Argument for a Reasons-Based Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]

, 2023
Intentional action is usually taken to be something that is paradigmatically under the direct control of our will. Belief-formation, on the other hand, is usually taken to be involuntary and not under our control.
Sanchez, Santiago
core   +1 more source

Indirect evaluative voluntarism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 109, Issue 3, Page 1009-1031, November 2024.
Abstract Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism.
Alex Horne
wiley   +1 more source