Results 1 to 10 of about 9,408 (70)
Deontic-doxastic belief revision and linear system model [PDF]
Frontiers in Psychology, 2022 Andrea Vestrucci, Andrea Vestrucci
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A Critical Review of the Theory of the Precedence of Action Over Belief with Emphasis on John Cottingham’s View [PDF]
Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī, 2023 The relationship between reason and faith is one of the most important topics in the philosophy of religion. This issue has been investigated from several aspects. One of these aspects is the relationship between action and religious belief.
Mahdi Khayatzadeh
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Locke's Ethics of Virtuous Thinking
Locke Studies, 2022 Locke is generally taken as promoting an ethics of belief. For him, we must apply a doxastic norm so that we properly conduct our understanding. Thus, he forcefully highlights one key epistemic norm, the norm of evidence, that prescribes that we adjust ...
Angélique Thébert
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WHAT’S VOLUNTARY IN STANCE VOLUNTARISM?
Manuscrito, 2021 Stance voluntarism highlights the role of the will in epistemic agency, claiming that agents can control the epistemic stances they assume in forming beliefs.
BRUNO MALAVOLTA E SILVA
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Manuscrito, 2023 This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at ...
CLAUDIO CORMICK, VALERIA EDELSZTEN
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Epistemic control without voluntarism
Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 95-109, October 2023., 2023 Abstract It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief‐like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom‐up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons‐responsive planning ...
Timothy R. Kearl
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The social epistemology of introspection
Mind &Language, Volume 38, Issue 3, Page 925-942, June 2023., 2023 I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves.
Elmar Unnsteinsson
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 106, Issue 3, Page 541-565, May 2023., 2023 Abstract The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge‐like concepts that there are.
Olle Risberg
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Are epistemic reasons normative?
Noûs, Volume 56, Issue 3, Page 670-695, September 2022., 2022 Abstract According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief – much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the normativity of epistemic reasons.
Benjamin Kiesewetter
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Philosophy Compass, Volume 16, Issue 8, August 2021., 2021 Abstract This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic
Cameron Boult
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