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Agency Evidentialism: Trust and Doxastic Voluntarism
In debates about trust and testimony, epistemologists have traditionally been divided into two groups: those who hold that accepting the testimony of other people should be a kind of credulity without evidence (anti-reductivism) and those who assert that
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija
doaj +2 more sources
Un-willed Beliefs: An Essay on Voluntariness and Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]
Doxastic involuntarism is somewhat of an epistemological orthodoxy. Contra this orthodoxy, I argue that doxastic voluntarism is routinely true. The aim is to argue for this by exploring the nature of the voluntary.
Davis, Benjamin
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Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments [PDF]
Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively ...
Shaffer, Michael J.
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Against a Descriptive Vindication of Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]
In this paper, I examine whether doxastic voluntarism should be taken seriously within normative doxastic ethics. First, I show that currently the psychological evidence does not positively support doxastic voluntarism, even if I accept recent ...
Nottelmann, Nikolaj; id_orcid
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Up-To-Me-Ness [PDF]
Rik Peels and I agree on the importance of the concept of epistemic responsibility. We disagree on whether responsibility for our beliefs requires the kind of control needed for responsibility for our actions. I say it does; he says it does not.
Steup, Matthias P.
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Martyr Motahhari on the Ethics of Belief [PDF]
The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for ...
Majid Mollayousefi +2 more
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Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism? [PDF]
Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful.
Rune Lomholt +5 more
core +1 more source
Doxastic voluntarism is the thesis that our beliefs are subject to voluntary control. While there’s some controversy as to what “voluntary control” amounts to (see 1.2), it’s often understood as direct control: the ability to bring about a state of ...
Jackson, Elizabeth, Boespflug, Mark
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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making
Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 51, Issue 1, Page 129-151, Spring 2020.
Leo Townsend
wiley +1 more source
The Illusion of Permissive Balancing
ABSTRACT The standard view among philosophers of normativity is that practical reasons balance permissively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible actions, either action is rational), while epistemic reasons balance prohibitively (i.e., when reasons are tied between incompatible doxastic attitudes, neither attitude may be rationally formed).
Jordan Scott
wiley +1 more source

