Results 11 to 20 of about 1,066 (119)
Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism [PDF]
Synthese, 2015 In this paper, I examine whether doxastic voluntarism should be taken seriously within normative doxastic ethics. First, I show that currently the psychological evidence does not positively support doxastic voluntarism, even if I accept recent conclusions by Matthias Steup that the relevant evidence does not decisively undermine voluntarism either ...
Nikolaj Nottelmann
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Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception [PDF]
Disputatio, 2007 Abstract Direct Doxastic Voluntarism — the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs — has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a conceptual/ logical/metaphysical impossibility or as a psychological ...
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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making [PDF]
, 2019 According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'.
Townsend, Leo
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Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility [PDF]
Kant Yearbook, 2013 AbstractThis paper shows that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief.
Alix Cohen
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Epistemic control without voluntarism
Philosophical Issues, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 95-109, October 2023., 2023 Abstract It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief‐like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom‐up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons‐responsive planning ...
Timothy R. Kearl
wiley +1 more source
The social epistemology of introspection
Mind &Language, Volume 38, Issue 3, Page 925-942, June 2023., 2023 I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves.
Elmar Unnsteinsson
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 106, Issue 3, Page 541-565, May 2023., 2023 Abstract The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge‐like concepts that there are.
Olle Risberg
wiley +1 more source
Are epistemic reasons normative?
Noûs, Volume 56, Issue 3, Page 670-695, September 2022., 2022 Abstract According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief – much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the normativity of epistemic reasons.
Benjamin Kiesewetter
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Philosophy Compass, Volume 16, Issue 8, August 2021., 2021 Abstract This paper provides a critical overview of recent work on epistemic blame. The paper identifies key features of the concept of epistemic blame and discusses two ways of motivating the importance of this concept. Four different approaches to the nature of epistemic blame are examined. Central issues surrounding the ethics and value of epistemic
Cameron Boult
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An Argument Against the Possibility of Gettiered Beliefs [PDF]
, 2014 In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0,
Gaultier, Benoit
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