Results 31 to 40 of about 9,408 (70)
Mental agency and rational subjectivity
Abstract Philosophy is witnessing an “Agential Turn,” characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency––agentialism about doxastic responsibility ...
Lucy Campbell, Alexander Greenberg
wiley +1 more source
Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism. Insights from Cases of Self-Deception [PDF]
In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its relation to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my ...
Odoj, Ewa
core +3 more sources
Truth, Communication, and Democracy
This article argues that truth is vital to deliberative democracy and to communication as an academic discipline. Our definition of truth is critical realist in nature—that is, it refers to an ontologically objective reality.
Douglas Porpora, Seif Sekalala
doaj
W. K. Clifford and William James on Doxastic Norms [PDF]
The main aim of this paper is to explain and analyze the debate between W. K. Clifford ("The Ethics of Belief", 1877) and William James ("The Will to Believe", 1896).
Oya, Alberto
core +4 more sources
Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence
The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidenced possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to ...
Scott Stapleford
doaj
Moore’s Paradox, Direct Doxastic Voluntarism, and Atheist Distrust [PDF]
The concept of belief is analyzed and then discussed within the context of the current climate of atheist distrust in America. To begin, Moore’s Paradox, and its relationship to an important claim made by Wittgenstein regarding false beliefs, is explored.
Thompson, Kyle
core +1 more source
Doxastic voluntarism and self-deception
Direct Doxastic Voluntarism the notion that we have direct (un-mediated) voluntary control over our beliefs has widely been held to be false. There are, however, two ways to interpret the impossibility of our having doxastic control: as either a ...
Booth, Anthony R.
core
Control Over Believing and Doxastic Responsibility. [PDF]
Visala A.
europepmc +1 more source
Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability. [PDF]
Howes M, Hundleby C.
europepmc +1 more source
Decision-Based Epistemology: sketching a systematic framework of Feyerabend's metaphilosophy. [PDF]
Kuby D.
europepmc +1 more source

