Results 211 to 220 of about 6,634 (261)
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Property Dualism and Substance Dualism
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2011I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind.
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1992
The general point of view of wave-particle duality proposed by Albert Einstein and Louis de Broglie represents all atomic objects such as photons, electrons, protons, etc. as consisting of the physical association of two entities: (1) a wave-packet, devoid of energy and momentum but nevertheless objectively real and propagating in space and time; (2 ...
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The general point of view of wave-particle duality proposed by Albert Einstein and Louis de Broglie represents all atomic objects such as photons, electrons, protons, etc. as consisting of the physical association of two entities: (1) a wave-packet, devoid of energy and momentum but nevertheless objectively real and propagating in space and time; (2 ...
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2012
Nuclear dualism is a characteristic feature of the ciliated protozoa. Tetrahymena have two different nuclei in each cell. The larger, polyploid, somatic macronucleus (MAC) is the site of transcriptional activity in the vegetatively growing cell.
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Nuclear dualism is a characteristic feature of the ciliated protozoa. Tetrahymena have two different nuclei in each cell. The larger, polyploid, somatic macronucleus (MAC) is the site of transcriptional activity in the vegetatively growing cell.
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Property Dualism without Substance Dualism?
Philosophical Papers, 2001Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true?
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New Blackfriars, 2010
AbstractThis is a response to two articles by William Charlton and Nicholas Lash. These authors criticize a view which they attribute to Descartes. According to this view, there is a dualism of mind and body. In this paper it is argued, first, that some form of dualism is intrinsically plausible, second, that the view these authors attribute to ...
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AbstractThis is a response to two articles by William Charlton and Nicholas Lash. These authors criticize a view which they attribute to Descartes. According to this view, there is a dualism of mind and body. In this paper it is argued, first, that some form of dualism is intrinsically plausible, second, that the view these authors attribute to ...
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2020
Abstract This chapter discusses the general relationship of EU law with domestic law. The positivist account of law produces two paradoxical accounts of EU law. The first account is the theory of European ‘monism’, supposing that the EU is the foundation of all law in the member states.
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Abstract This chapter discusses the general relationship of EU law with domestic law. The positivist account of law produces two paradoxical accounts of EU law. The first account is the theory of European ‘monism’, supposing that the EU is the foundation of all law in the member states.
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2018
Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical.
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Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical.
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The seductive allure of the brain: Dualism and lay perceptions of neuroscience
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2021Iris Berent
exaly
, 2017 Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?
Philosophical Studies, 2012Lycan William G
exaly