Results 291 to 300 of about 50,036 (314)

Dynamic Leveraging–Deleveraging Games

Operations Research, 2020
We endogenize the dynamics of a large borrower’s leverage based on a new type of game among the lender, the leveraging/deleveraging game. Leverage is mean reverting around a long-run level and explosive above an instability level. This is driven by the changing nature of the lenders’ game from strategic substitutability to one-sided strategic ...
Andreea Minca, Johannes Wissel
openaire   +1 more source

DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURES [PDF]

International Game Theory Review, 2006
The paper explores the properties of multistage games with perfect information, in which (unlike the classic Kuhnian definition) the conditional coalition partition at any vertex is determined by a chance move and remains unchanged until the random process repeats at the next vertex. A new value for such a game is proposed in terms of a PMS-vector. It
LEON PETROSJAN, SVETLANA MAMKINA
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Dynamic resource allocation games

Theoretical Computer Science, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Guy Avni, Thomas A. Henzinger, Orna Kupferman   +2 more
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Dynamics in network interaction games

Distributed Computing, 2009
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Martin Hoefer 0001, Siddharth Suri
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Repeated and Dynamic Games

2015
In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff ...
Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
openaire   +1 more source

Chaos in game dynamics

Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1992
Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies.
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A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification

Theoretical Economics, 2010
Ulrich Doraszelski, Juan F Escobar
exaly  

Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games

American Economic Review, 2007
Susan Athey, Ilya Segal, Athey Susan
exaly  

Dynamic difficulty adjustment on MOBA games

Entertainment Computing, 2017
Luiz Chaimowicz
exaly  

Avoiding the curse of dimensionality in dynamic stochastic games

Quantitative Economics, 2012
Ulrich Doraszelski
exaly