Results 141 to 150 of about 1,340 (195)
Do we have (in)compatibilist phenomenology of deliberation?: a survey. [PDF]
Front PsycholHonma S, Inarimori K, Miyazono K.
europepmc +1 more source
Eliminativism About Consciousness [PDF]
, 2020 This chapter examines a radical philosophical position about consciousness: eliminativism. Eliminativists claim that consciousness does not exist and/or that talk of consciousness should be eliminated from science. These are strong positions to take, and require serious defence. In the first section, the chapter introduces the difference between entity
Elizabeth Irvine
exaly +3 more sources
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2019 A central thesis of Steven French's brand of ontic structural realism has always been his eliminativism about objects. Unsurprisingly, this bold and controversial thesis has seen a lot of critical discussion. In his book The Structure of the World-Metaphysics & Representation, French accordingly defends this thesis against a range of challenges.
Wolff, J. E.; id_orcid
exaly +7 more sources
The Many Theories of Mind: Eliminativism and Pluralism in Context [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2022 In recent philosophy of science there has been much discussion of both pluralism, which embraces scientific terms with multiple meanings, and eliminativism, which rejects such terms.
Joseph Gough
exaly +2 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
2001
AbstractFolk ontology includes statues. Eliminativism denies that statues exist but says that there are atoms arranged statuewise. In this chapter, I explain eliminativism and define ‘arranged statuewise’. I also argue that eliminativism is neither obviously false nor contradictory.
Trenton Merricks
exaly +2 more sources
AbstractFolk ontology includes statues. Eliminativism denies that statues exist but says that there are atoms arranged statuewise. In this chapter, I explain eliminativism and define ‘arranged statuewise’. I also argue that eliminativism is neither obviously false nor contradictory.
Trenton Merricks
exaly +2 more sources
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catching version of this says that tennis players exist, although tennis balls and tennis rackets do not. In our paper, we focus critical attention upon a defense of such a view presented by Trenton Merricks in his book, Objects and Persons .
JOHN W. CARROLL, WILLIAM R. CARTER
openaire +1 more source
Do folk objects exist? A selective eliminativism says that some do and some don't. One eye-catching version of this says that tennis players exist, although tennis balls and tennis rackets do not. In our paper, we focus critical attention upon a defense of such a view presented by Trenton Merricks in his book, Objects and Persons .
JOHN W. CARROLL, WILLIAM R. CARTER
openaire +1 more source
Eliminativism and the ambiguity of ?belief?
Synthese, 1995It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions.
openaire +1 more source