Results 151 to 160 of about 1,340 (195)
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2018
‘Eliminativism’ refers to the view that mental phenomena – for example, beliefs, desires, conscious states – do not exist. Although this can seem absurd on its face, in the twentieth century it has gained a wide variety of adherents, for example, scientific behaviourists, who thought that all human and animal activity could be explained in terms of the
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‘Eliminativism’ refers to the view that mental phenomena – for example, beliefs, desires, conscious states – do not exist. Although this can seem absurd on its face, in the twentieth century it has gained a wide variety of adherents, for example, scientific behaviourists, who thought that all human and animal activity could be explained in terms of the
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2018
This chapter asks whether postcolonial defenses of feminized power and criticisms of the incorporation of women into a gender-neutral public sphere can be understood as compatible with feminism. It argues that the tools of nonideal universalism can explain why many such postcolonial views are more compatible with feminism than is often thought.
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This chapter asks whether postcolonial defenses of feminized power and criticisms of the incorporation of women into a gender-neutral public sphere can be understood as compatible with feminism. It argues that the tools of nonideal universalism can explain why many such postcolonial views are more compatible with feminism than is often thought.
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Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism
2001Abstract I argue that anything a baseball causes—if baseballs exist—is also caused by the baseball's atoms working in concert. Moreover, a baseball is ‘causally irrelevant’ to what its atoms cause. These two claims imply that baseballs, if they existed, would be at best mere overdeterminers of whatever they cause.
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1988
(1988). Churchland's eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 489-497.
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(1988). Churchland's eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 489-497.
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2001
Abstract I argue that we human organisms—though composite—are not mere overdeterminers. We cause, by way of having conscious mental properties, some effects that our constituent atoms do not cause. (My defence of this claim involves considerations regarding supervenience.
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Abstract I argue that we human organisms—though composite—are not mere overdeterminers. We cause, by way of having conscious mental properties, some effects that our constituent atoms do not cause. (My defence of this claim involves considerations regarding supervenience.
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Mind & Language, 1989
There is a school of thought which links connectionist models of cognition to eliminativism‐the thesis that the constructs of commonsense psychology (principally, beliefs and desires) do not exist. This way of construing the impact of connectionist modelling is, I argue, deeply mistaken and depends crucially on a shallow analysis of the notion of ...
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There is a school of thought which links connectionist models of cognition to eliminativism‐the thesis that the constructs of commonsense psychology (principally, beliefs and desires) do not exist. This way of construing the impact of connectionist modelling is, I argue, deeply mistaken and depends crucially on a shallow analysis of the notion of ...
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Eliminativism and the Problem of Epiphenomenalism
2000AbstractIn Chapter 8 it was argued that the token identity theory is not only false, but proves ultimately to be unintelligible, when it is conceived of as a general theory of the nature of mind, i.e., as a theory which is intended to encompass such psychological ‘states’ as beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on.
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Abstract Many arguments in philosophy of psychology assume the following conditional: if a psychological term does not refer to a natural kind, then that term ought to be eliminated from psychology. This is the Eliminativist Claim. The Eliminativist Claim draws a direct link between natural kindhood and conceptual reform in psychology.
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On Biological Function: A Critical Examination of Eliminativism
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science, 2022Bohang Chen
exaly