Results 111 to 120 of about 196 (135)
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Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2001zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Chow, Clare Chua, Sarin, Rakesh K.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion for likely gains and (weak) ambiguity seeking for unlikely
Sean Crockett +2 more
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Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion for likely gains and (weak) ambiguity seeking for unlikely
Sean Crockett +2 more
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Revue d'économie politique, 2001
Résumé Le célèbre Paradoxe d’Ellsberg [1961] a attiré l’attention sur l’importance de la précision des probabilités qui sous-tendent les choix risqués. A la suite de ce travail de pionnier, de nombreuses études ont montré que les sujets ont en général une aversion à l’imprécision (au caractère vague) qui entache la spécification des probabilités.
David V. Budescu +2 more
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Résumé Le célèbre Paradoxe d’Ellsberg [1961] a attiré l’attention sur l’importance de la précision des probabilités qui sous-tendent les choix risqués. A la suite de ce travail de pionnier, de nombreuses études ont montré que les sujets ont en général une aversion à l’imprécision (au caractère vague) qui entache la spécification des probabilités.
David V. Budescu +2 more
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The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg
Economics and Philosophy, 1986In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed ...
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A Solution to Ellsberg's Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018Ellsberg's famous thought experiments demonstrate that most people prefer less ambiguous alternatives to more ambiguous ones. This apparently violates Savage's Sure-thing Principle. I provide a solution to Ellsberg's paradox. More precisely, I demonstrate that ambiguity aversion can be readily explained by subjectivistic decision theory.
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Probability, Expected Utility, and the Ellsberg Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011The Ellsberg paradox is often cited as evidence for unknowable "ambiguity" versus computable "risk", and a refutation of the Savage axioms regarding expected utility maximization and the program for revealing "subjective" or "belief-type" probabilities.
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On the relationship between Keynes’s conception of evidential weight and the Ellsberg paradox [PDF]
A number of scholars have noted that Ellsberg’s seminal 1961QJE critique of the subjective expected utility model bears certain resemblances to ideas expressed in J. M. Keynes’s 1921 A Treatise on Probability. Ellsberg did not mention Keynes’s work in his article and referred instead to F.
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Exploring Ellsberg’s Paradox in Vague-Vague Cases
2007We explore a generalization of Ellsberg’s paradox to the Vague-Vague (V-V) case, where neither of the probabilities (urns) is specified precisely, but one urn is always more precise than the other. We present results of an experiment explicitly designed to study this situation.
Karen M. Kramer, David V. Budescu
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Analysing Ellsberg’s Paradox by Means of Interval-Probability
1998The results reported by Ellsberg (1961) are often considered paradoxical. Indeed they reveal behaviour contrasting the sure-thing principle. An analysis employing modern tools produces two insights: 1) The experimental setting of Ellsberg can be adequately described only by means of interval-probability.
Kurt Weichselberger, Thomas Augustin
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Asset Pricing Theory in Light of Ellsberg Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011In 2008, Epstein and Schneider formulated a microstructure-inspired theory in which one could determine price volatility through a number of other market parameters such as asset volatility, risk free rate and dividend rate. A particular feature of the Epstein-Schneider theory is an extremely high price elasticity of the volatility of a risky stock ...
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