Results 141 to 150 of about 506 (164)

Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2001
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Chow, Clare Chua, Sarin, Rakesh K.
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Ellsberg's Hidden Paradox

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion for likely gains and (weak) ambiguity seeking for unlikely
Sean Crockett, Yehuda (Yud) Izhakian, Julian C. Jamison   +2 more
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Ambiguity in information systems: rows, columns, and the Ellsberg paradox

Knowledge and Information Systems
Marcin Wolski, Anna Gomolińska, Wolski Marcin   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging [PDF]

Theoretical Economics, 2017
Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously.
Mark Dean, Pietro Ortoleva
exaly   +2 more sources

Beyond Ellsberg's paradox

Revue d'économie politique, 2001
Résumé Le célèbre Paradoxe d’Ellsberg [1961] a attiré l’attention sur l’importance de la précision des probabilités qui sous-tendent les choix risqués. A la suite de ce travail de pionnier, de nombreuses études ont montré que les sujets ont en général une aversion à l’imprécision (au caractère vague) qui entache la spécification des probabilités.
David V. Budescu, Kristine M. Kuhn, Karen M. Kramer   +2 more
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The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

Economics and Philosophy, 1986
In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed ...
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A Solution to Ellsberg's Paradox

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
Ellsberg's famous thought experiments demonstrate that most people prefer less ambiguous alternatives to more ambiguous ones. This apparently violates Savage's Sure-thing Principle. I provide a solution to Ellsberg's paradox. More precisely, I demonstrate that ambiguity aversion can be readily explained by subjectivistic decision theory.
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Probability, Expected Utility, and the Ellsberg Paradox

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
The Ellsberg paradox is often cited as evidence for unknowable "ambiguity" versus computable "risk", and a refutation of the Savage axioms regarding expected utility maximization and the program for revealing "subjective" or "belief-type" probabilities.
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Exploring Ellsberg’s Paradox in Vague-Vague Cases

2007
We explore a generalization of Ellsberg’s paradox to the Vague-Vague (V-V) case, where neither of the probabilities (urns) is specified precisely, but one urn is always more precise than the other. We present results of an experiment explicitly designed to study this situation.
Karen M. Kramer, David V. Budescu
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Analysing Ellsberg’s Paradox by Means of Interval-Probability

1998
The results reported by Ellsberg (1961) are often considered paradoxical. Indeed they reveal behaviour contrasting the sure-thing principle. An analysis employing modern tools produces two insights: 1) The experimental setting of Ellsberg can be adequately described only by means of interval-probability.
Kurt Weichselberger, Thomas Augustin
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