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Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Chow, Clare Chua, Sarin, Rakesh K.
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E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox
Theory and Decision, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Eichberger, Jürgen, Kelsey, David
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion for likely gains and (weak) ambiguity seeking for unlikely
Sean Crockett +2 more
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Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion for likely gains and (weak) ambiguity seeking for unlikely
Sean Crockett +2 more
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Ellsberg Paradox Intuition and Choquet Expected Utility
, 1995 Alain Chateauneuf
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Levi on the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes
Economics and Philosophy, 1989 Patrick Maher
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Revue d'économie politique, 2001
Résumé Le célèbre Paradoxe d’Ellsberg [1961] a attiré l’attention sur l’importance de la précision des probabilités qui sous-tendent les choix risqués. A la suite de ce travail de pionnier, de nombreuses études ont montré que les sujets ont en général une aversion à l’imprécision (au caractère vague) qui entache la spécification des probabilités.
David V. Budescu +2 more
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Résumé Le célèbre Paradoxe d’Ellsberg [1961] a attiré l’attention sur l’importance de la précision des probabilités qui sous-tendent les choix risqués. A la suite de ce travail de pionnier, de nombreuses études ont montré que les sujets ont en général une aversion à l’imprécision (au caractère vague) qui entache la spécification des probabilités.
David V. Budescu +2 more
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A Solution to Ellsberg's Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018Ellsberg's famous thought experiments demonstrate that most people prefer less ambiguous alternatives to more ambiguous ones. This apparently violates Savage's Sure-thing Principle. I provide a solution to Ellsberg's paradox. More precisely, I demonstrate that ambiguity aversion can be readily explained by subjectivistic decision theory.
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The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg
Economics and Philosophy, 1986In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed ...
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Ambiguity in information systems: rows, columns, and the Ellsberg paradox
Knowledge and Information SystemsMarcin Wolski, Anna Gomolińska
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Exploring Ellsberg’s Paradox in Vague-Vague Cases
2007We explore a generalization of Ellsberg’s paradox to the Vague-Vague (V-V) case, where neither of the probabilities (urns) is specified precisely, but one urn is always more precise than the other. We present results of an experiment explicitly designed to study this situation.
Karen M. Kramer, David V. Budescu
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