Results 31 to 40 of about 721 (171)

Enativismo radical: exposição, desafios e perspectivas [Radical enactivism: exposition, challenges and prospects]

open access: yesPrincípios, 2018
Primeiro, o enativismo é apresentado como a ideia de que a ação é constitutiva da cognição e é situado historicamente a partir da psicologia ecológica de Gibson.
Giovanni Rolla
doaj   +1 more source

Defining the Environment in Organism–Environment Systems

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2020
Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment in understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not merely passive receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic ...
Amanda Corris
doaj   +1 more source

The coherence of enactivism and mathematics education research: A case study [PDF]

open access: yesAvant, 2014
This article addresses the question of the coherence of enactivism as a research perspective by making a case study of enactivism in mathematics education research.
David A Reid
doaj  

Toward an Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing Account

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2021
In this paper, I argue for an embodied, embedded approach to predictive processing and thus align the framework with situated cognition. The recent popularity of theories conceiving of the brain as a predictive organ has given rise to two broad camps in ...
Elmarie Venter
doaj   +1 more source

Enactive Cognition and the Other: Enactivism and Levinas Meet Halfway

open access: yesJournal of French and Francophone Philosophy, 2020
This paper makes a comparison between enactivism and Levinas’ philosophy. Enactivism is a recent development in philosophy of mind and cognitive science that generally defines cognition in terms of a subject’s natural interactions with the physical ...
Geoffrey Dierckxsens
doaj   +1 more source

RADICAL ENACTIVISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE [PDF]

open access: yesKriterion, 2018
I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness (one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on) are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according
Giovanni Rolla
doaj   +1 more source

From Engel to Enactivism: Contextualizing the Biopsychosocial Model

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2021
In this article we offer a two-part commentary on Bolton and Gillett’s reconceptualization of Engel’s biopsychosocial model. In the first section we present a conceptual and historical assessment of the biopsychosocial model that differs from the analysis by Bolton and Gillett.
Awais Aftab, Kristopher Nielsen
openaire   +3 more sources

Beyond Immediate Givenness: Husserl's Content‐Apprehension Schema in Light of Merleau‐Ponty's Critique of Sensation

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (2012 [1945]) opens with a detailed critique of traditional philosophical accounts of sensation, generally understood as having Husserl's “content‐apprehension schema” among its targets. The schema sees perception as resulting from the interpretation (“apprehension” or “apperception”) of “raw ...
Yamina Venuta
wiley   +1 more source

Embodied, Enacted, and Multimodal: Exploring Science Teachers’ Metaphors in Authentic Classroom Contexts

open access: yesScience Education, Volume 110, Issue 5, Page 1469-1496, September 2026.
ABSTRACT Over the past decades, science education research has extensively examined the role of metaphors in teaching and learning science. However, much of the existing research has focused on verbal manifestations of metaphors, thereby overlooking aspects of metaphors that may occur in non‐verbal form. This study reconceptualises metaphors as dynamic
Magdalena Kersting   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Feeling Virtue: An Enactive Theory of Approval

open access: yesTheoria, Volume 92, Issue 4, August 2026.
ABSTRACT A neo‐sentimentalist theory of virtue holds that a trait is virtue if, and only if, it merits approval. Neo‐sentimentalists tend to be sceptical about the prospect of such a theory because it seems unlikely that feelings of approval can be characterised without reference to the notion of virtue. I argue that that scepticism is uncalled for. My
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
wiley   +1 more source

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