Results 11 to 20 of about 2,762 (268)

Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation

Philosophical Studies, 2023
AbstractThis paper introduces three new concepts: epistemic health, epistemic immunity, and epistemic inoculation. Epistemic health is a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals. It is constituted by many different factors (e.g. possessing true beliefs, being disposed
Adam Piovarchy, Scott Siskind
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Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching [PDF]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2022
AbstractOne type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight” or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our rational acceptance of these propositions is evidentially ...
Moretti L, Wright C
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Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]

Synthese, 2016
If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
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Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk

Synthese, 2022
AbstractIn this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by ...
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]

Synthese, 2017
Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
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Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas, and Epistemic Dispositions [PDF]

, 2021
People sometimes face an epistemic dilemma with regards to stereotyping. We harbor a stereotype that reflects something of social reality, e.g., high rates of criminal involvement among members of a certain social group. But if we apply the stereotype when making judgments about individuals, we make certain mistakes, e.g., failing to notice positive ...
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Kritik Epistemologi Islam dalam Islamologi Terapan

Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam, 2015
This article discusses critique of Islamic epistemology within applied Islamology. The writer concludes that Islamic epistemology is an episteme which has been originally derived from Islamic doctrines. It can be obtained through a number of methods. The
Isa Anshori
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On patheme: affective shifts and Gustavian culture

Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, 2023
Despite the attention that the affective sphere has reached in the last decades, affectivity has generally been supposed to be a consequence of historical processes, not changing their direction.
Erik Wallrup
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Epistemic Theodicy, Epistemic Evil, and Epistemic Responsibility

Religions, 2023
The paper explores the concept of epistemic theodicy and strengthens an argument that reconciles human fallibility with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. This argument is grounded in epistemic responsibility, emphasizing our epistemic autonomy.
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Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Earthquake Engineering

Science and Engineering Ethics, 2023
AbstractThe importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific.
L. Zanetti, D. Chiffi, L. Petrini
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