Results 241 to 250 of about 879,801 (285)
Confabulation and epistemic authority
AbstractMahr & Csibra (M&C) claim that episodic remembering's autonoetic character serves as an indicator of epistemic authority. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with the existence of confabulation errors – where participants fabricate memories of experiences that never happened to them.
Sarah Robins
openaire +3 more sources
Epistemic inequality reconsidered: an inquiry into epistemic authority [PDF]
Epistemic inequality is something we face in our everyday experience whenever we acknowledge our epistemic inferiority towards some and our epistemic superiority towards others. The negative side of this epistemic phenomenon has received due attention in the context of the debate on epistemic injustice: whenever an epistemic subject deflates the ...
Croce, Michel
openaire +3 more sources
Epistemic foundations of democratic authority [PDF]
Until recently, epistemic considerations have not been relevant for answering the question about democratic authority. It was usually considered that justifications that go in the direction of knowledge, truth or correctness favored decision making by experts rather than democratic decision making.
Mladenovic, Ivan
core +4 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Negotiating Epistemic Authority
2017Why do we trust what other people say, and form beliefs on the basis of their speech? One answer: they are taken to have epistemic authority. Intuitively this means that the other person (or institution, or group) is taken to be authoritative in what they say, at least with respect to a particular domain. Here, we want to claim that there are (at least)
Eric McCready, Grégoire Winterstein
openaire +1 more source
2021
AbstractDisrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual
openaire +1 more source
AbstractDisrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual
openaire +1 more source
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, EPISTEMIC PREEMPTION, AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Episteme, 2016ABSTRACTHow does the intellectually virtuous person respond to the beliefs of those whom they judge to be their epistemic superiors? Linda Zagzebski argues that we ought to take the beliefs of those we judge to be our epistemic authorities as a preemptive reason to believe the same.
openaire +1 more source
An Ecology of Epistemic Authority
Episteme, 2011I offer an examination of trust relations in scientific inquiry as they seem to contrast with a lack of trust in an example of knowledge imposed from above by an unaccountable institutional power structure. On this basis I argue for a re-reading of John Hardwig's account of the place of trust in knowledge, and suggest that it translates less well than ...
openaire +1 more source
The Epistemic Authority of Expertise
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1994All of us defer to the authority of experts. Living in a world of increasing specialization we find that deferral to experts is integral to even the most mundane habits of our ordinary life. I regularly complain about mistakes in meteorologist's forecasts, yet I still carry an ...
openaire +1 more source
Epistemic authority in context
2011Words and concepts are useful tools; they play a function vital to human survival. Conceptual analysis tends to ignore this fact, examining concepts in utter isolation from actual social life. As a result, conceptual analysts may unwittingly offer a definition that, were it correct, would leave the concept unfit to do the work it has to do.
openaire +1 more source

