Results 71 to 80 of about 88,808 (113)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

On the compatibility of deontologism with moderate externalism in a theory of epistemic justification: M. Bergmann's solution

Социально-гуманитарные знания, 2022
В статье рассматриваются альтернативные способы эпистемологической концептуализации обоснования, заданные в парадигмах интернализма и экстернализма, и анализируется их соотношение с принципами эпистемического деонтологизма. Производится реконструкция и анализ аргументов эпистемолога М.
А.В. Галухин
semanticscholar   +4 more sources

Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense

Dialogue, 2015
The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e ...
P. Bondy
openaire   +2 more sources

Justification Without Excuses

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2022
Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. Moreover, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs ...
Blake McAllister
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Notes on Contributors

Psychoanalytic Review, 2021
Patrick Bondy is with the Department of Philosophy at Trent University, on a Limited Term Appointment as Assistant Professor. Prior to that, he held a Postdoctoral Fellowship with the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University.
Patrick Bondy
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility

Metaphilosophy, 2022
AbstractAccording toUniversal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible.
openaire   +1 more source

Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Erkenntnis, 2011
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our ...
openaire   +2 more sources

The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification

Philosophical Perspectives, 1988
The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement,
openaire   +1 more source

The deontological conception of epistemic justification and doxastic voluntarism

Analysis, 1994
According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification as endorsed by most traditional epistemologists, one is justified in holding a belief if and only if one is in the clear, or epistemically responsible, in holding the belief. William Alston criticizes this conception and any theory of epistemic justification based on this conception ...
openaire   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy