Results 221 to 230 of about 1,358 (250)
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Objectivity, epistemic humility and responsible science
2020La ciencia y la tecnología no realizan sus funciones de manera objetiva, sino que se construyen desde los puntos de vista de los individuos que participan de ella y de ellos heredan sus defectos y virtudes. En este artículo se describen los sesgos cognitivos individuales y de grupo que más afectan negativamente a la práctica tecnocientífica y se ...
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A Call for Epistemic Humility in Political Philosophy
Public Affairs QuarterlyAbstract Political philosophers old and new have defended the twin claims that (i) traditions embody wisdom, and (ii) transforming tradition based on aprioristic theory threatens to disregard that wisdom. This article argues that while a priori theorizing about justice is indeed epistemically valuable, a priori theories of justice ...
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Epistemic humility and evidential arguments from evil
2005Evidential arguments from evil (for atheism) have been the focus of much attention in contemporary philosophy of religion. I begin by closely examining the very influential early arguments of William Rowe. Stephen Wykstra proposes a condition Rowe's argument must meet, which he labels CORNEA.
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Epistemic humility and empathic imagination
Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics, 2018openaire +2 more sources
Epistemic Confidence, Humility, and Kenosis in Interfaith Dialogue
2016This chapter advances the need for humility and a kenotic approach in interfaith dialogue. Interfaith dialogue entails the sharing of truth claims. Oftentimes, these are proclaimed with a certain epistemic confidence. Most of these claims are absolute in nature and are not empirically verifiable and so risk being dismissed altogether.
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Rational humility and other epistemic killjoys
2010I consider three ways in which our epistemic situation might be more impoverished than we ordinarily take it to be. I argue that we can save our robust epistemic lives from the skeptic. But only if we accept that they aren't quite as robust as we thought.
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