Results 1 to 10 of about 540 (229)
Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge. [PDF]
In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism - internal reasons reliabilism - that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
Engel M.
europepmc +4 more sources
Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck [PDF]
This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck.
Lazović Živan
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Epistemic Luck and Anti-Luck Epistemology in the View of Duncan Pritchard [PDF]
The problem of epistemic luck arises when a person has a true belief that is only true by luck. Before Gettier, it was believed that the element of justification would be sufficient for knowledge; but he showed that it is possible to have a justified ...
Fatemeh Meshkibaf +2 more
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Collective Epistemic Luck [PDF]
AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective.
Moisés Barba +1 more
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Moral Luck as a Normative Challenge [PDF]
Chance and luck permeate our lives. They can be explained differently ‒ as the will of gods, the violation of a cause-effect relationship, the distribution of probabilities, a win in a natural or social lottery.
Alexander A. Shevchenko
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The Free Agent, Luck, and Character [PDF]
Whether we are free agents or not and to what extent depends on factors such as the necessary conditions for free will and our definition of human agency and identity.
Zahra Khazaei
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Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck?
Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne
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Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck [PDF]
AbstractReductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties.
Carter, J. Adam, Pritchard, Duncan
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The Gettier Problem: An Analysis in the Context of al-Fārābī’s Epistemic Levels
In the history of philosophy, knowledge has been defined in the traditional sense since Plato as justified true belief. Despite the dominance of this definition in epistemology, the adequacy of the fundamental elements that make up definitive knowledge ...
Muhammed Abdullah Haksever
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Of Luck Both Epistemic and Moral in Questions of Doping and Non-Doping
This article is a case study of a question of possible doping and how our insights into our moral judgements about doping are subject to considerations of both moral, but more presciently, epistemic luck.
Kenneth William Kirkwood
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