Results 11 to 20 of about 24,595 (270)
Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]
Synthese, 2016 If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
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Extended cognition and epistemic luck [PDF]
Synthese, 2013 When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
J Adam Carter
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]
Synthese, 2017 Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
Job de Grefte
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Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Metaphilosophy, 2003 The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding todifferenttypes of epistemic luck.
Duncan Pritchard
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Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2023 Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck?
Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne
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Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Noûs, 2013 AbstractReductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties.
Carter, J. Adam, Pritchard, Duncan
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The Gettier Problem: An Analysis in the Context of al-Fārābī’s Epistemic Levels
İslam Tetkikleri Dergisi, 2022 In the history of philosophy, knowledge has been defined in the traditional sense since Plato as justified true belief. Despite the dominance of this definition in epistemology, the adequacy of the fundamental elements that make up definitive knowledge ...
Muhammed Abdullah Haksever
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Of Luck Both Epistemic and Moral in Questions of Doping and Non-Doping
Ethics in Progress, 2020 This article is a case study of a question of possible doping and how our insights into our moral judgements about doping are subject to considerations of both moral, but more presciently, epistemic luck.
Kenneth William Kirkwood
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Incidental knowledge defended [PDF]
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"The paper analyses epistemic happenstance and argues for the possibility of incidental knowledge. It considers how minimal concepts of knowledge, reflecting various basic intuitions, operate in situations where there is an influence of chance or ...
A. M. Kardash
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Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge [PDF]
, 2018 In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief.
Peet, Andrew, Pitcovski, Eli
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