Results 11 to 20 of about 673 (243)
Extended cognition and epistemic luck [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2013 When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
J Adam Carter, Carter J Adam
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Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2021 AbstractThis essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this.
Nilanjan Das
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Epistemic Luck in Stoicism [PDF]
Ancient Philosophy, 2022 The Stoics held that knowledge depends on the special kind of true appearances they called ‘apprehensive.’ Sextus Empiricus reports that they also thought that some true appearances are not apprehensive—and hence unable to lead to knowledge—because they are true merely ‘externally and by chance’, which suggests that the Stoics were aware of the problem
Pavle Stojanović
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Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Noûs, 2013 AbstractReductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties.
J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard
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Collective Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Acta Analytica, 2021 AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective.
Moisés Barba +1 more
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Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck [PDF]
Acta Analytica, 2022 Michael Shaffer
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Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge [PDF]
Acta Analytica, 2022 Michael Shaffer
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VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC LUCK, REVISITED [PDF]
Metaphilosophy, 2008 Abstract:In this article I return to an argument that I presented in earlier work to the effect that virtue epistemology is at worse false and at best unmotivated. In the light of recent responses to this argument from such figures as John Greco, Guy Axtell, and Kelly Becker, I here re‐state and re‐evaluate this argument.
Duncan Pritchard
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Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind [PDF]
, 2019 Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000)
J. Adam Carter
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