Results 1 to 10 of about 189,244 (238)

Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yesSynthÈse, 2013
When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
Joseph Adam Carter
exaly   +12 more sources

Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge [PDF]

open access: yesActa Analytica, 2022
In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism - internal reasons reliabilism - that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.
Mylan Engel
exaly   +5 more sources

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yesMetaphilosophy, 2003
The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding todifferenttypes of epistemic luck.
Duncan Pritchard
exaly   +5 more sources

Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours.
Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando   +1 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]

open access: yesSynthese, 2017
Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
Job de Grefte, de Grefte, Job
openaire   +5 more sources

Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]

open access: yesSynthese, 2016
If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
core   +8 more sources

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yesNoûs, 2013
AbstractReductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties.
Carter, J. Adam, Pritchard, Duncan
openaire   +6 more sources

Collective Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yesActa Analytica, 2021
AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective.
Moisés Barba   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Indian Philosophy, 2021
AbstractThis essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this.
openaire   +2 more sources

LUCK: EVOLUTIONARY AND EPISTEMIC [PDF]

open access: yesEpisteme, 2016
AbstractThis paper advances two theses about evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics. The first is that, while such arguments are often motivated with the rhetoric of ‘luck', proponents of these arguments have not distinguished between the kinds of luck that might lead to the formation of a true belief.
openaire   +1 more source

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