Results 11 to 20 of about 540 (229)
In almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck. An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours.
Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando +1 more
openaire +2 more sources
Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]
If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
openaire +4 more sources
Incidental knowledge defended [PDF]
The paper analyses epistemic happenstance and argues for the possibility of incidental knowledge. It considers how minimal concepts of knowledge, reflecting various basic intuitions, operate in situations where there is an influence of chance or ...
A. M. Kardash
doaj +1 more source
Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge
It will be argued that personal agency, far from lacking epistemic value, contributes to knowledge in a substantial way. To this end, it will be claimed that what Sosa calls an epistemic perspective is necessary to solve the binding problem in ...
Modesto Gómez Alonso
doaj +1 more source
Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]
Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
openaire +1 more source
Sorte, virtude, e anulabilidade epistêmica
Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature.
João Rizzio Vicente Fett
doaj +1 more source
Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck [PDF]
AbstractThis essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this.
openaire +2 more sources
Extended cognition and epistemic luck [PDF]
When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
openaire +3 more sources
Examining Greco’s Solution to ‘The Garbage Problem’ in the Epistemology of Testimony [PDF]
Posing the issue of fallacies, Aristotle tried to keep safe the discursive reason-one of the sources of knowledge-from likely errors. Likewise, John Greco wants, in fact, to determine the reliable framework of testimony-another source of knowledge-by ...
Morteza Motavalli, Mahdi Azimi
doaj +1 more source
LUCK: EVOLUTIONARY AND EPISTEMIC [PDF]
AbstractThis paper advances two theses about evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics. The first is that, while such arguments are often motivated with the rhetoric of ‘luck', proponents of these arguments have not distinguished between the kinds of luck that might lead to the formation of a true belief.
openaire +1 more source

