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International Journal for Educational Integrity, 2023 There is no consensus on definitions of educational or academic integrity, and their philosophical relationship with the notion of responsibility is complex. Here, we aim to i) disentangle these three notions.
Hélène Hagège
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Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism
Informal Logic, 1995 In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault.
Robert C. Pinto
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Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility [PDF]
, 2016 This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which ...
Carter, J. Adam, Gordon, Emma C.
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Disagreement Lost and Found [PDF]
, 2017 According to content-relativist theories of moral language, different speakers use the same moral sentences to say different things. Content-relativism faces a well-known problem of lost disagreement.
Finlay, Stephen
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The Pragmatics of Insensitive Assessments
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2010 In assessing the veridicality of utterances, we normally seem to assess the satisfaction of conditions that the speaker had been concerned to get right in making the utterance.
Alexander Almér, Gunnar Björnsson
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Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini's Positive Philosophy [PDF]
, 2020 In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist ...
Pace Giannotta, Andrea
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Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2021 If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are ...
Sinan Dogramaci
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The Philosophical Review, 2009 In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed aim of Fear of Knowledge, to dislodge relativistic conviction, could not be
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Entre relativisme et dogmatisme : la quête d’une troisième voie
Revue Internationale d’Éducation de Sèvres, 2018 Some French students subscribe, to varying degrees, to positions such as negationism, questioning the theory of evolution or certain “conspiracy theories”.
Frank Smith
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Quasi-fideism and epistemic relativism [PDF]
Inquiry, 2022 Quasi-fideism accounts for the rationality of religious belief by embracing the idea that a subject’s most fundamental religious commitments are essentially arational. It departs from standard forms of fideism, however, by contending that this feature of religious commitment does not set it apart from belief in general.
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