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Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk. [PDF]
Synthese, 2022 AbstractIn this paper, I provide an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk: the risk of believing in error. The motivation for this account is threefold. First, it makes epistemic anxiety a species of anxiety, thus rendering psychologically respectable a notion that has heretofore been taken seriously only by ...
Newton L.
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Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching [PDF]
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2022 AbstractOne type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight” or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our rational acceptance of these propositions is evidentially ...
Moretti L, Wright C
openaire +5 more sources
Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2016 If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
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Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice
Metaphilosophy, 2023 AbstractEpistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most ...
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Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments [PDF]
Studia Logica, 2007 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Don Fallis
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality
The Reasoner, 2022 AbstractHow much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence.
Richard Pettigrew
doaj +3 more sources
Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence [PDF]
SynthÈse, 2017 Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk epistemology. It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing account, known as anti-luck epistemology, but is superior on a number of fronts. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply the motivation ...
Duncan Pritchard
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Risk-informed decision-making in the presence of epistemic uncertainty [PDF]
International Journal of General Systems, 2011 An important issue in risk analysis is the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. In this paper, the use of distinct representation formats for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is advocated, the latter being modelled by sets of possible values.
Didier Dubois, Dominique Guyonnet
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Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem [PDF]
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2019 AbstractVeritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is deter...
Richard Pettigrew
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