Results 261 to 270 of about 84,040 (310)
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2022
Broadly, virtues are excellences. Applied to epistemology, then, virtues are excellences of epistemic agents, thinkers, or cognizers. As virtue epistemology has risen to prominence in the past several decades, virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemology have become numerous, systematic, and diverse. Accordingly, the work on epistemic virtues and vices,
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Broadly, virtues are excellences. Applied to epistemology, then, virtues are excellences of epistemic agents, thinkers, or cognizers. As virtue epistemology has risen to prominence in the past several decades, virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemology have become numerous, systematic, and diverse. Accordingly, the work on epistemic virtues and vices,
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Metaphilosophy, 2003
Introduction: Moral and Epistemic Virtues: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling) and Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). Part I: Theory:. 1. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good: Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma). 2. The Pursuit of Epistemic Good: Philip Percival (University of Glasgow). 3.
Michael S. Brady, Duncan Pritchard
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Introduction: Moral and Epistemic Virtues: Michael S. Brady (University of Stirling) and Duncan Pritchard (University of Stirling). Part I: Theory:. 1. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good: Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma). 2. The Pursuit of Epistemic Good: Philip Percival (University of Glasgow). 3.
Michael S. Brady, Duncan Pritchard
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Synthese, 2019
Epistemic conservatism (EC) says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. In his new book On Evidence in Philosophy (2019), William Lycan argues that there is no special objection to EC that does not also impugn the other epistemic virtues.
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Epistemic conservatism (EC) says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. In his new book On Evidence in Philosophy (2019), William Lycan argues that there is no special objection to EC that does not also impugn the other epistemic virtues.
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2014
An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical ...
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An epistemic virtue is a personal quality conducive to the discovery of truth, the avoidance of error, or some other intellectually valuable goal. Current work in epistemology is increasingly value-driven, but this volume presents the first collection of essays to explore whether virtue epistemology can also be naturalistic, in the philosophical ...
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2018
What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off?
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What would happen if extended cognition (EC) and virtue-responsibilism (VR) were to meet? Are they compatible, or incompatible? Do they have projects in common? Would they, as it were, end their meeting early, or stick around but run out of things to say? Or, would they hit it off?
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Epistemic Virtues of Institutions
2020In everyday speech, we don’t only attribute virtues and vices to individuals, but also to institutions. In doing so, we implicitly assume that these collective entities are certain kinds of agents, the bearers of epistemic features – states, attitudes, beliefs, actions or like – for which they can be blamed or applauded.
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Theoretical (epistemic) virtues
2018When two competing theories or hypotheses explain or accommodate just the same data (and both are unrefuted), which should be preferred? According to a classical, purely formal confirmation theory, neither – each is confirmed to the same degree, and so the two hypotheses are precisely equal in epistemic status, warrant or credibility. Yet in real life,
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Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues
Ratio, 2002Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both ...
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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, EPISTEMIC PREEMPTION, AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Episteme, 2016ABSTRACTHow does the intellectually virtuous person respond to the beliefs of those whom they judge to be their epistemic superiors? Linda Zagzebski argues that we ought to take the beliefs of those we judge to be our epistemic authorities as a preemptive reason to believe the same.
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue
2001Abstract Ordinary practical akrasia, incontinence, or weakness of the will occurs when someone consciously or deliberately makes a choice that she sincerely believes is wrong. She decides to continue smoking in spite of sincerely acknowledging that it would be best, all things considered, to give up; or she reaches for a cigarette while ...
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