Results 271 to 280 of about 84,040 (310)

A (Different) Virtue Responsibilism: Epistemic Virtues Without Motivations

Acta Analytica, 2018
Debate rages in virtue epistemology between virtue reliabilists and responsibilists. Here, I develop and argue for a new kind of responsibilism that is more conciliar to reliabilism. First, I argue that competence-based virtue reliabilism(s) cannot adequately ground epistemic credit. Then, with this problem in hand, I show how Aristotle’s virtue theory
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Epistemic virtues and cosmopolitan learning

The Australian Educational Researcher, 2008
For them the talk of global interconnectivity is both remote and highly abstract. The social processes that many globalization theorists describe have little sense to them. But should this really be the case? Just because they are not globally networked, can we assume that global processes do not also affect them?
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Cognitive virtues and epistemic evaluations

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1994
L'A. substitue a l'ethique de la croyance une ethique de l'investigation qui rend compte des evaluations epistemiques de nos investigations considerees comme une sorte d'activite, et du role regulateur d'une theorie systematique de la justification qui ne prend tout son sens qu'au coeur du parallele structurel entre raison pratique et raison theorique,
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Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology

Philosophical Studies, 2006
Michael Brady, Duncan Pritchard
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The virtues of epistemic conservatism

Synthese, 2007
Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken.
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Resistance as Epistemic Vice and as Epistemic Virtue

2013
Abstract This chapter argues that testimonial injustice involves a lack of proportionality in the appraisals of epistemic qualities such as credibility. Being always comparative and contrastive, an epistemic appraisal concerns more than the particular subject(s) under consideration, given the comparison and contrast classes that support ...
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Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief

2001
Abstract A major presupposition of ethics is that our moral lives can be conducted well or poorly. Our intellectual lives—our questioning and judging, our reflection and inference, our criticism and responses to criticism—can also be conducted well or poorly.
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Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Values:

2021
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Is epistemic anxiety an intellectual virtue?

SynthÈse, 2021
Frank Cabrera
exaly  

Epistemic virtue in higher education: testing the mechanisms of intellectual character development

Current Psychology, 2023
Gabe Orona
exaly