Results 261 to 270 of about 2,343,490 (291)

On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement

Theory and Decision, 2002
The author considers finite \(n\)-person games in normal form. \textit{H. Norde, J. Potters, H. Reijnierse} and \textit{D. Vermeulen} [Games and Econ. Behav. 12, No. 2, 219--225 (1996; Zbl 0848.90132)] proved that each solution concept satisfying non-emptiness, optimality, and consistency axioms coincides with the Nash equilibrium concept.
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Correction of 'On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement'

Theory and Decision, 2003
Concerns the author's article in ibid. 53, No. 4, 371--392 (2002; Zbl 1052.91012).
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Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

Econometrica, 1995
Summary: We present three distinct approaches to perfect and proper equilibria for infinite normal form games. In the first two approaches, players ``tremble'' in the infinite games playing full support approximate best responses to others' strategies. In the strong approach, a tremble assigns high probability to the set of pure best responses; in the ...
Simon, Leo K, Stinchcombe, Maxwell B
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Refinement of proper equilibrium points

Optimization, 1995
In this paper we refine the concept of proper equilibrium point for n-person normal games due to Myerson 1978. We introduce the g-proper equilibrium points which we prove the existence under the condition of [ILM 0001]. They compare the strategy weight compounded not homogeneously.
E. Marchi, A. Neme
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A Refinement of Logit Quantal Response Equillibrium

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Unlike the Nash equilibrium, logit quantal response equilibrium is affected by positive affine transformations of players’ von Neumann–Morgenstern utility payoffs. This paper presents a modification of a logit quantal response equilibrium that makes this equilibrium solution concept invariant to arbitrary normalization of utility payoffs. Our proposed
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Equilibrium refinement in psychological games

Games and Economic Behavior, 1992
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Equilibrium Refinements

2023
Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia   +1 more
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Refinements of the ?-core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition

International Journal of Game Theory, 1988
This paper considers a relationship between the modified strong equilibria of a repeated game and the modified \(\beta\)-core of the component game. Here the strong equilibrium concept is modified so that whenever a coalition S deviates from a given strategy n-tuple \(\bar s=(\bar s_ 1,...,\bar s_ n)\), the strategies \(\bar s_{N-S}\) of the ...
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Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements

Ricerche Economiche, 1994
Summary: Given an extensive game \(G\), three subsets of the normal-form equivalence class of \(G\) are defined: the subset of simultaneous games [denoted by \(\text{Sim}(G)\)], the subset of subgame-preserving quasi-simultaneous games [denoted by \(\text{SubSim}(G)\)], and, finally, the subset consisting of the game \(G\) itself.
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The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements

Algorithmic Game Theory, 2010
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, T. Lund   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source