Results 71 to 80 of about 701,833 (202)

A Critical Reflection on Utilitarianism as the Basis for Psychiatric Ethics. Part II: Utilitarianism and Psychiatry

open access: yes, 2007
In this second paper we contextualize utilitarianism to the craft of psychiatry and consider its function within the realm of the professional ethics of psychiatrists as physicians.
Robertson, Michael, Walter, Gary
core  

Track Record Arguments in Normative Ethics

open access: yesPacific Philosophical Quarterly, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Track record arguments (TRAs) contend that it speaks in favor of an ethical theory (such as utilitarianism) if many of its past proponents had moral views that were controversial at their time but which we now consider to be clearly true (e.g., women's equal rights in 18th century Europe). This paper explores how to construct potentially sound
Leonard Dung
wiley   +1 more source

Utilitarianism and Egoism in Sidgwickian Ethics

open access: yes, 2014
In his excellent Sidgwickian Ethics, David Phillips argues that Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism from the axioms is less successful than Sidgwick believes. He also argues that Sidgwick’s argument for egoism is more successful than this argument for
Shaver, Robert
core   +1 more source

AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding ...
Adam Bradley, Bradford Saad
wiley   +1 more source

Climate Policy under Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism [PDF]

open access: yes
Empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism (DU). DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its consequences for ...
Geir B. Asheim, Simon Dietz
core  

How Theists Can Answer the “Why be Moral?” Question: An Indirect Reason‐Generation Account

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, I give a new type of theistic answer to the “Why be moral?” question. After briefly clarifying the version of the question I'm concerned with, as well as extant theistic answers to the question, I argue for a new kind of answer. Roughly, while on standard answers, future (post death) benefits directly generate present reason to ...
Justin Morton
wiley   +1 more source

Utilitarian population ethics: a survey [PDF]

open access: yes
This essay is a survey of utilitarian criteria aimed at guiding what Parfit (1984) called Different Number Choices (i.e. choices affecting both people’s number and identities).
Grégory Ponthière
core  

AI Death

open access: yesPhilosophical Perspectives, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper addresses the following questions: When do AIs die? Are AI labs or AI users causing the death of AIs? Is this bad for the AIs? What are our ethical responsibilities in light of the answers to these questions? It is currently unclear whether AIs are welfare subjects, and, if they are, whether their death is bad for them. But we argue
Simon Goldstein, Harvey Lederman
wiley   +1 more source

Human Rights Against Climate Risks and the Problem of Paralysis

open access: yes
Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
Richard Endörfer
wiley   +1 more source

Two Moralities of Recognition

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A morality of recognition maintains that moral norms have their authority in virtue of the ways in which those norms enact an ideal moral relationship. T. M. Scanlon argues that this approach can yield an account of the distinctive force of morality and an attractive account of moral motivation. We find this approach to theorizing about morals
Barry Maguire, Oded Na'aman
wiley   +1 more source

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