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Learning to Play Bayesian Games [PDF]

David K Levine, Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg   +2 more
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Hypergames and bayesian games: A theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information

Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2012
The article recalls the framework of hypergames, wherein each agent plays her own perceived game, along with the associated notions of hyper-Nash and best response equilibria. The main result is that these games can be represented as Bayesian games and the above equilibrium concepts then correspond to Bayesian Nash equilibria with subjective ...
Yasuo Sasaki, Kyoichi Kijima, Kijima Kyoichi   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

International Journal of Game Theory, 1985
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Shmuel Zamir, Zamir Shmuel
exaly   +2 more sources

Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Management Science, 1974
The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific “Selten model.” As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.
Joseph T. Howson, Jr., Robert W. Rosenthal   +1 more
exaly   +3 more sources

Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game

Management Science, 1968
Parts I and II of this paper have described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. Two cases have been distinguished: consistent games in which there exists some basic probability distribution from which the players' subjective probability distributions can be derived as conditional probability distributions; and ...
John C Harsányi
exaly   +3 more sources

Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

Management Science, 1968
Part I of this paper has described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. It has been shown that, if the various players' subjective probability distributions satisfy a certain mutual-consistency requirement, then any given game with incomplete information will be equivalent to a certain game with complete information ...
John C Harsányi
exaly   +3 more sources

Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

Management Science, 1967
The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc. However, each player has a subjective probability
John C Harsányi
exaly   +2 more sources

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 2001
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +1 more source

Bayesian Stackelberg Game for Antijamming Transmission With Incomplete Information

IEEE Communications Letters, 2016
The smart jammers pose a severe threat to wireless communications due to their abilities of learning the users’ transmission strategies. A Stackelberg game can be formulated to model and analyze the hierarchical interactions between the user and the smart jammer.
Luliang Jia, Fuqiang Yao, Youming Sun, Yingtao Niu, Yonggang Zhu   +4 more
openaire   +1 more source