Results 71 to 80 of about 410 (96)

Beyond Arrow: Revealing True Preferences [PDF]

In this paper, we examine the existence of strict strategy-proof voting mechanisms. Using Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem we prove any rational social choice function that respects Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and ...
Arora, Aryan
core  

A MISSING PROOF OF THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM

A MISSING PROOF OF THE GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM
A short and direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem a la Amartya Senʼs proof of Arrowʼs impossibility theorem is given.
openaire  

Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent [PDF]

Ariel Rubinstein
core  

Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]

Economics Letters, 2012
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Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
exaly   +3 more sources

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Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Economics Letters, 2001
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arunava Sen
exaly   +3 more sources

Another induction proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem

Economics Letters, 2009
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Susumu Cato
exaly   +3 more sources

Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

International Economic Review, 1983
\textit{A. Gibbard} [Econometrica 41, 587-601 (1973; Zbl 0325.90081)] and \textit{M. A. Satterthwaite} [J. Econ. Theory 10, 187-217 (1975; Zbl 0315.90088)] have independently proved that if a social choice function or voting scheme f is strategy-proof (or non-manipulable) and the range of f contains at least three alternatives, then it is dictatorial ...
Salvador Barbera
exaly   +2 more sources

A Differential Approach to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]

, 2012
Numerous simple proofs of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1977, Satterthwaite, 1975) has been given in the literature. These are based on a number of different intuitions about the most fundamental reason for the result. In this paper we derive the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem once more, this time in a differentiable environment
Korpela, Ville
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Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare, 2010
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Alexander Reffgen, Reffgen, Alexander
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Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]

, 2009
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general ...
Tjark Weber, Weber, Tjark
openaire   +3 more sources