Results 61 to 70 of about 410 (96)

The Relationship Between the Normalized Gradient Addition Mechanism and Quadratic Voting. [PDF]

Public Choice, 2017
Benjamin D, Heffetz O, Kimball M, Lougee D.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2007
Balinski M, Laraki R.
europepmc   +1 more source

Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes [PDF]

We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthelling is required to maximize the expected utility being computed with respect to the voter's prior beliefs ...
Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar
core  

Elections Can be Manipulated Often [PDF]

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random
Gil Kalai, Ehud Friedgut, Noam Nisan
core  

Mutual Exclusion of Influence: a New Proof of the Gibbard--Satterthwaite Theorem and the Synergy Obstruction

This paper gives a new proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and develops an information-theoretic framework characterizing dictatorship as the unique entropy profile compatible with strategy-proofness, surjectivity, and three or more alternatives.
openaire   +1 more source

Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules [PDF]

We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters’ knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters’ behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such ...
Smith, Doug, Borgers, Tilman
core   +1 more source

Collective agency and positive political theory. [PDF]

J Theor Polit
Moen LJK.
europepmc   +1 more source

Voces Populi and the Art of Listening [PDF]

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles ...
Stensholt, Eivind
core  

Deep mechanism design: Learning social and economic policies for human benefit. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Tacchetti A, Koster R, Balaguer J, Leqi L, Pislar M, Botvinick MM, Tuyls K, Parkes DC, Summerfield C.   +8 more
europepmc   +1 more source