Results 41 to 50 of about 410 (96)
Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [PDF]
This paper provides an alternative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem Alternative proof Monotonicity Strategy ...
Cato, Susumu
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Schrödinger's Ballot: Quantum Information and the Violation of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel), 2021 Sun X, He F, Sopek M, Guo M.
europepmc +1 more source
Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: A game-theoretic epidemiological analysis. [PDF]
Appl Math Model, 2023 Zhou Y, Rahman MM, Khanam R, Taylor BR.
europepmc +1 more source
The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules [PDF]
Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes.
Roberto Serrano
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"A Gibbard-Satterhwaite Theorem for public good economies" [PDF]
, 2001 We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and ...
Moscoso, María José, Moreno, Diego
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Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized [PDF]
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic ...
John Duggan, Thomas Schwartz
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The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness [PDF]
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that
Olivier Bochet, Bettina Klaus
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A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory (forthcoming in "Applied Mathematics and Computation") [PDF]
Recently Eliaz(2004) has presented a unified framework to study (Arrovian) social welfare functions and non-binary social choice functions based on the concept of 'preference reversal'.
Yasuhito Tanaka
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A theorem on preference aggregation [PDF]
, 2003 I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the ...
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica +1 more
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In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question : what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function ...
Arunava Sen, Shurojit Chatterji
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