Results 31 to 40 of about 410 (96)
Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems [PDF]
Econometrica, 2000 Summary: This paper introduces a new notion of consistency for social choice functions, called self-selectivity, which requires that a social choice function employed by a society to make a choice from a given alternative set it faces should choose itself from among other rival such functions when it is employed by the society to make this latter ...
openaire +2 more sources
A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies [PDF]
, 2001 We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and ...
Moscoso, María José, Moreno, Diego
core
Against corporate responsibility
Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 55, Issue 1, Page 44-61, Spring 2024.
Lars J. K. Moen
wiley +1 more source
A Theorem on Preference Aggregation [PDF]
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the ...
Salvador Barberà
core
Parallel proofs of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [PDF]
Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems are proved using a common proof strategy based on a dictatorship result for choice functions. One of the instrumental results obtained shows the inconsistency between the basic assumption in each of these ...
Antonio Quesada
core
Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness [PDF]
, 1992 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of collective-choice procedures treats only of resolute procedures. Few real or reasonable procedures are resolute.
Duggan, John, Schwartz, Thomas
core
A Unifying Impossibility Theorem [PDF]
This paper considers social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to each non-empty subset of social alternatives. We impose three requirements on these correspondences: unanimity, independence of preferences over infeasible alternatives and ...
Shino Takayama, Priscilla Man
core
Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection [PDF]
, 2008 A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s ...
Stensholt, Eivind
core
Coalitional Structure of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]
, 2018 The Muller-Satterthwaite theorem states that social choice functions that satisfy unanimity and monotonicity are also dictatorial. Unlike Arrow’s theorem, it does not assume that the function produces a transitive social ordering.
Pingzhong Tang (5414954) +1 more
core +1 more source
Deliberative Democracy and Incompatibilities of Choice Norms. [PDF]
Behav Sci (Basel), 2023 Nurmi H.
europepmc +1 more source