Results 11 to 20 of about 410 (96)
A Quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Without Neutrality [PDF]
Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2012 46 pages; v2 has minor structural changes and adds open ...
Elchanan Mossel, Miklós Z. Rácz
openaire +6 more sources
(Weak) Pairwise Justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2023 Abstract We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively.
Salvador Barberà +3 more
openaire +7 more sources
The geometry of manipulation — A quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [PDF]
Combinatorica, 2010 We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of $q \ge 4$ alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least $10^{-4} \eps^2 n^{-3} q^{-30}$, where $\eps$ is the minimal statistical distance between f and the family of ...
Marcus Isaksson +2 more
core +9 more sources
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]
, 2018 International ...
Bernhard, Pierre, Deschamps, Marc
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Quantum Voting and Violation of Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorem [PDF]
CoRR, 2023 35 pages, 1 figure, 2 ...
Ethan Dickey, Aidan Casey
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Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems Revisited [PDF]
, 2019 A voting system is demonstrated which meets Arrow's 5 conditions and also satisfies the Gibbard-Satterthwaite demand for strategyproofness. The strategy is contained in the voting procedure itself so voters are incentivized to vote sincerely. This procedure allows for the circumventing of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
John Lawrence (6719237)
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The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited [PDF]
, 1999 This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals). The proof of the theorem is further simplified when the voting rule is
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
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Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
Theoretical Economics, Volume 18, Issue 2, Page 837-883, May 2023., 2023 Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single‐valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships.
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer
wiley +1 more source
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 1195-1220, November 2021., 2021 The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are “neighbors.” A social choice function is locally strategy‐proof if no type of a voter can gain by ...
Ujjwal Kumar +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 1, Page 101-128, January 2021., 2021 I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock‐for‐stock mergers, and reallocation ...
Alan D. Miller
wiley +1 more source