Results 21 to 30 of about 410 (96)
Belief Merging and Judgment Aggregation in Fuzzy Setting
Advances in Fuzzy Systems, Volume 2012, Issue 1, 2012., 2012 We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.
Ismat Beg +2 more
wiley +1 more source
A Missing Proof of The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 2018 A short and direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem à la Amartya Sen's proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem is given.
openaire +2 more sources
Can Approximation Circumvent Gibbard-Satterthwaite? [PDF]
, 2010 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts that any reasonable voting rule cannot be strategyproof. A large body of research in AI deals with circumventing this theorem via computational considerations; the goal is to design voting rules that are ...
Procaccia, Ariel
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Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games [PDF]
, 2015 International audienceThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote.
Elkind, Edith +3 more
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Extensive measurement in social choice
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 4, Page 1581-1618, November 2024.Extensive measurement is the standard measurement‐theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a
Jacob M. Nebel
wiley +1 more source
(The Impossibility of) Deliberation‐Consistent Social Choice
American Journal of Political Science, Volume 68, Issue 3, Page 1075-1088, July 2024.Abstract There is now a growing consensus among democratic theorists that we should incorporate both “democratic deliberation” and “aggregative voting” into our democratic processes. But how should the two democratic mechanisms of deliberation and voting interact?
Tsuyoshi Adachi +2 more
wiley +1 more source
A natural adaptive process for collective decision‐making
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 667-703, May 2024.Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the collective decision, put both balls back into the urn, and repeat.
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
wiley +1 more source
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games for k-Approval Rules [PDF]
, 2019 International audienceThe Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem states that for any non-dictatorial voting system there will exist an election where a voter, called a manipulator, can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically.
Hughes, Daniel +3 more
core +1 more source
The scholarship assignment problem [PDF]
, 2002 There are n graduate students and n faculty members. Each student will be assigned a scholarship by the joint faculty. The socially optimal outcome is that the best student should get the most prestigious scholarship, the second-best student should get ...
Moreno, B. +2 more
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The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited [Elektronisk resurs] [PDF]
, 1999 This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy.
Lund University., Svensson, Lars-Gunnar,
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