Results 1 to 10 of about 410 (96)
The proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem revisited [PDF]
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2014 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Lars-Gunnar Svensson
exaly +7 more sources
On the alternating use of “unanimity” and “surjectivity” in the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem [PDF]
Economics Letters, 2007 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
M Remzi Sanver, Emre Dogan
exaly +8 more sources
A topological proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [PDF]
Economics Letters, 2023 We give a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. We construct two topological spaces: one for the space of preference profiles and another for the space of outcomes. We show that social choice functions induce continuous mappings between the two spaces. By studying the properties of this mapping, we prove the theorem.
Yuliy Baryshnikov, Joseph Root
exaly +5 more sources
A social diffusion model with an application on election simulation. [PDF]
ScientificWorldJournal, 2014 Issues about opinion diffusion have been studied for decades. It has so far no empirical approach to model the interflow and formation of crowd’s opinion in elections due to two reasons. First, unlike the spread of information or flu, individuals have their intrinsic attitudes to election candidates in advance.
Lou JK +7 more
europepmc +2 more sources
Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach
Economics Letters, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Philip Renȳ
exaly +3 more sources
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof
Economics Letters, 2000 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
exaly +2 more sources
A one-shot proof of Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [PDF]
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013 This paper provides a simple and transparent proof of a new social choice impossibility theorem. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are straightforward corollaries.
exaly +3 more sources
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Mathematical Social SciencesBy endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
Agustin Bonifacio
exaly +4 more sources
A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design
Econometrica, Volume 91, Issue 4, Page 1495-1526, July 2023., 2023 We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the
Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan
wiley +1 more source
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
Theoretical Economics, Volume 18, Issue 2, Page 463-479, May 2023., 2023 We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values.
Tangren Feng, Axel Niemeyer, Qinggong Wu
wiley +1 more source