Continuous analogue to iterative optimization for PDE-constrained inverse problems. [PDF]
Inverse Probl Sci Eng, 2019 Boiger R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Committee proposals and restrictive rules. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1999 Banks JS.
europepmc +1 more source
ON A "MONOTONICITY" METHOD FOR THE SOLUTION OF NONLINEAR EQUATIONS IN BANACH SPACES. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1963 Minty GJ.
europepmc +1 more source
Nonlinear monotone and accretive operators in banach spaces. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1968 Browder FE.
europepmc +1 more source
Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents.
The authors study a general implementation problem for exchange economies with a continuum of players and private information, and test the robustness of the results for sequences of approximating finite economies.
Vives, Xavier, Mas-Colell, Andreu
core
On the unification of the calculus of variations and the theory of monotone nonlinear operators in banach spaces. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1966 Browder FE.
europepmc +1 more source
On the stability of the martingale optimal transport problem: A set-valued map approach
Continuity of the value of the martingale optimal transport problem on the real line w.r.t. its marginals was recently established in Backhoff-Veraguas and Pammer (2019) and Wiesel (2019).
Sester, Julian, Neufeld, Ariel
core
VARIATIONAL BOUNDARY VALUE PROBLEMS FOR QUASI-LINEAR ELLIPTIC EQUATIONS, III. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1963 Browder FE.
europepmc +1 more source
Cost Minimization of Nonconvex Firms under Prices in Normal Cones.
Clarke's normal cone has been frequently used to formulate the marginal cost pricing rule for nonconvex firms. The author provides examples where a firm with convex iso-output sets is not minimizing its cost at a price vector in the normal cone.
Ishimoto, Osamu
core
Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria [PDF]
This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi- libria in a general class of coalitional bargaining games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation.
John Duggan
core