Results 51 to 60 of about 932 (110)
Continuity and Equilibrium Stability [PDF]
This paper discusses the problem of stability of equilibrium points in normal form games in the tremling-hand framework. An equilibrium point is called perffect if it is stable against at least one seqence of trembles approaching zero. A strictly perfect
C. D. Aliprantis, I. Topolyan
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Econometrics for Learning Agents
, 2015 The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption.
Nekipelov, Denis +2 more
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This paper covers the theory of the uncovered set used in the literatures on tournaments and spatial voting. I discern three main extant definitions, and I introduce two new concepts that bound exist- ing sets from above and below: the deep uncovered set
John Duggan
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Polyhedral Convexity and the Existence of Approximate Equilibria in Discontinuous Games [PDF]
Radzik (1991) showed that two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have " { equilibria for all " > 0, provided that payo® functions are upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave.
Carmona, Guilherme
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Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets [PDF]
, 2001 We analyze a non-cooperative game in which the set of feasible strategy profiles is compact and convex but possibly non-rectangular. Thus, a player's feasible strategies may depend on the strategies used by others, as in Debreu's (1952,1982) generalized ...
Banks, Jeffrey S., Duggan, John
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Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria [PDF]
This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi- libria in a general class of coalitional bargaining games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation.
John Duggan
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Extremal Choice Equilibrium: Existence and Purification with Infinite-Dimensional Externalities [PDF]
We prove existence and purification results for equilibria in which players choose extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic environments exhibiting a product structure.
John Duggan, Paulo Barelli
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Moral hazard and private monitoring [PDF]
game theory;moral hazard ...
Bhaskar, V., Damme, E.E.C. van
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A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand [PDF]
, 2018 We prove that combinatorial demand functions are characterized by two properties: continuity and the law of ...
Chambers, Christopher P. +1 more
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Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
, 2017 The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called "(decomposable) coarser transition kernels".
He, Wei, Sun, Yeneng
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