Results 31 to 40 of about 151 (105)
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 6, Page 2007-2042, November 2025.We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals ...
Daniel Luo, Alexander Wolitzky
wiley +1 more source
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1487-1503, October 2025.ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only ...
Mehmet S. Ismail
wiley +1 more source
Vectorial exceptional families of elements
, 2010 Vector complementarity problems, Exceptional families of elements, Hemicontinuity, Pseudomonotone multivalued mappings, 49J40, 90C33,
Y. Chiang
core +1 more source
Market Allocations Under Conflation of Goods
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1681-1691, October 2025.ABSTRACT We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading opportunities and shifting competitive pressures.
Niccolò Urbinati, Marco LiCalzi
wiley +1 more source
Adversarial coordination and public information design
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 763-813, May 2025.We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action.
Nicolas Inostroza, Alessandro Pavan
wiley +1 more source
On continuity of incomplete preferences
, 2013 A weak (strict) preference relation is continuous if it has a closed (open) graph; it is hemicontinuous if its upper and lower contour sets are closed (open). If preferences are complete these four conditions are equivalent.
Gerasimou, Georgios
core +1 more source
The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 1, Page 41-70, January 2025.This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information.
S. Nageeb Ali +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 353-425, January 2025.This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the τ‐quantile of the stream of future utilities, for τ ∈ (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications.
Luciano de Castro +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Some Existence Results for Solutions of Generalized Vector Quasi-equilibrium Problems [PDF]
, 2011 [[abstract]]In this paper, we consider more general forms of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems for multivaluedmaps which include many known vector quasi-equilibrium problems and generalized vector quasi-variational inequality problems as ...
L. J. Lin;Q.H.Ansari ;Y. J. Huang
core
RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1607-1624, November 2024.Abstract We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead ...
David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli
wiley +1 more source