Results 31 to 40 of about 932 (110)
The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking
Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 1, Page 41-70, January 2025.This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information.
S. Nageeb Ali +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, Page 353-425, January 2025.This paper studies a dynamic quantile model for intertemporal decisions under uncertainty, in which the decision maker maximizes the τ‐quantile of the stream of future utilities, for τ ∈ (0,1). We present two sets of contributions. First, we generalize existing results in directions that are important for applications.
Luciano de Castro +2 more
wiley +1 more source
RAZOR‐THIN MASS ELECTIONS WITH HIGH TURNOUT
International Economic Review, Volume 65, Issue 4, Page 1607-1624, November 2024.Abstract We argue that traditional voting models fail to fully explain the frequency of very close mass elections with high turnout. Instead, we model elections as a competition between incentive schemes to mobilize voters. We elucidate conditions under which parties might prefer close elections, as the potential to be pivotal motivates voters instead ...
David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli
wiley +1 more source
Pure Exploration with Multiple Correct Answers [PDF]
, 2019 We determine the sample complexity of pure exploration bandit problems with multiple good answers. We derive a lower bound using a new game equilibrium argument.
Degenne, Rémy, Koolen, Wouter M.
core +1 more source
Fighting terrorism: How to position rapid response teams?
Naval Research Logistics (NRL), Volume 71, Issue 5, Page 709-727, August 2024.Abstract In light of recent terrorist attacks, we introduce and study a Stackelberg game between a government and a terrorist. In this game, the government positions a number of heavily‐armed rapid response teams on a line segment (e.g., a long boulevard or shopping avenue) and then the terrorist attacks a location with the highest potential impact of ...
Lotte van Aken +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
Mathematical Finance, Volume 34, Issue 2, Page 467-521, April 2024.Abstract The widespread use of market‐making algorithms in electronic over‐the‐counter markets may give rise to unexpected effects resulting from the autonomous learning dynamics of these algorithms. In particular the possibility of “tacit collusion” among market makers has increasingly received regulatory scrutiny.
Rama Cont, Wei Xiong
wiley +1 more source
Applied Mathematics Letters, 1998 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +3 more sources
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 245-284, January 2024.We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options.
Sarah Auster, Nicola Pavoni
wiley +1 more source
Stability of the utility maximization problem with random endowment in incomplete markets
, 2010 We perform a stability analysis for the utility maximization problem in a general semimartingale model where both liquid and illiquid assets (random endowments) are present.
Biagini +24 more
core +1 more source
Existence of Equilibrium Prices for Discontinuous Excess Demand Correspondences [PDF]
The aim of the paper is to obtain the existence of equilibrium prices in economies where the excess demand correspondences—differently from the usual condition—are not necessarily upper semicontinuous.
Vincenzo Scalzo
core +1 more source