Results 21 to 30 of about 932 (110)
Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 4, Page 1471-1512, November 2021., 2021 I study a repeated principal–agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the ...
Rumen Kostadinov
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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games
Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 1055-1093, July 2021., 2021 In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large.
Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck
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Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 2, Page 717-757, May 2021., 2021 We provide an equilibrium framework for modeling the behavior of an agent who holds a simplified view of a dynamic optimization problem. The agent faces a Markov decision process, where a transition probability function determines the evolution of a state variable as a function of the previous state and the agent's action.
Ignacio Esponda, Demian Pouzo
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A necessary and sufficient condition for upper hemicontinuous set-valued mappings without compact-values being upper demicontinuous [PDF]
Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 1998 The purpose of this article is to give a characterization of an upper hemicontinuous mapping with non-empty convex values being upper demicontinuous, i.e., we show that an upper hemicontinuous set-valued mapping with non-empty convex values (not necessarily compact-valued) is upper demicontinuous if and only if the set-valued mapping has no interior ...
Yang, Gan-Shang, Yuan, George Xian-Zhi
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Econometrica, Volume 93, Issue 6, Page 2007-2042, November 2025.We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals ...
Daniel Luo, Alexander Wolitzky
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Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information [PDF]
, 2015 This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with ...
He, Wei, Sun, Yeneng
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International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1487-1503, October 2025.ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only ...
Mehmet S. Ismail
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Market Allocations Under Conflation of Goods
International Economic Review, Volume 66, Issue 4, Page 1681-1691, October 2025.ABSTRACT We study competitive equilibria in exchange economies when a continuum of goods is conflated into a finite set of commodities. The design of conflation choices affects the allocation of scarce resources among agents, by constraining trading opportunities and shifting competitive pressures.
Niccolò Urbinati, Marco LiCalzi
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Adversarial coordination and public information design
Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 763-813, May 2025.We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action.
Nicolas Inostroza, Alessandro Pavan
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, 2010 In this paper we establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions for nonlinear evolution equations on Banach space with locally monotone operators, which is a generalization of the classical result by J.L. Lions for monotone operators. In particular,
Beyn +36 more
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