Results 41 to 50 of about 151 (105)
Fighting terrorism: How to position rapid response teams?
Naval Research Logistics (NRL), Volume 71, Issue 5, Page 709-727, August 2024.Abstract In light of recent terrorist attacks, we introduce and study a Stackelberg game between a government and a terrorist. In this game, the government positions a number of heavily‐armed rapid response teams on a line segment (e.g., a long boulevard or shopping avenue) and then the terrorist attacks a location with the highest potential impact of ...
Lotte van Aken +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Existence results for a class of hemivariational-like inequality problems
Analele Stiintifice ale Universitatii Ovidius Constanta: Seria MatematicaIn this work, we establish existence results for a class of hemivariational-like inequality problems driven by a trifunction and perturbed by a bifunction.
Mahalik Kartikeswar +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Dynamics of market making algorithms in dealer markets: Learning and tacit collusion
Mathematical Finance, Volume 34, Issue 2, Page 467-521, April 2024.Abstract The widespread use of market‐making algorithms in electronic over‐the‐counter markets may give rise to unexpected effects resulting from the autonomous learning dynamics of these algorithms. In particular the possibility of “tacit collusion” among market makers has increasingly received regulatory scrutiny.
Rama Cont, Wei Xiong
wiley +1 more source
On the stability of the martingale optimal transport problem: a set-valued map approach
, 2021 Continuity of the value of the martingale optimal transport problem on the real line w.r.t. its marginals was recently established in Backhoff-Veraguas and Pammer (2019) and Wiesel (2019).
Sester, Julian +3 more
core +1 more source
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 245-284, January 2024.We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave the principal unaware of relevant options.
Sarah Auster, Nicola Pavoni
wiley +1 more source
Solving dynamic public insurance games with endogenous agent distributions: theory and computational approximation [PDF]
, 2016 We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the characterization of equilibrium payoff correspondences in history-dependent dynamic policy games to a class with endogenously heterogeneous private agents.
Stauber, Ronald, Kam, Timothy
core +1 more source
Nash bargaining and risk aversion [PDF]
, 2016 It is widely accepted among axiomatic bargaining theorists that if one bargainer is more risk averse than a second, the second will be a tougher bargaining opponent than the first against all opponents.
Rausser, Gordon C +3 more
core +1 more source
All but one free ride when wealth effects are small [PDF]
, 2011 Quasilinear preferences on a public good and a numeraire good are limits of preferences where both goods are normal. The set of equilibria of the voluntary contribution (or private provision) game is easily characterized under quasilinearity by: top ...
Joaquim Silvestre, Silvestre, Joaquim
core +2 more sources
Applied Mathematics Letters, 1998 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +3 more sources
On Continuity of Robust Equilibria [PDF]
, 2012 We relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium ro-bustness by allowing approximate equilibria when information in a game becomes incomplete. The new notion is termed "approximate robustness".
Kajii, Atsushi, Haimanko, Ori
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