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Implementing Implementation Research: Teaching Implementation Research to HIV Researchers
Current HIV/AIDS Reports, 2021Given the growth in HIV-related implementation research, there is a need to expand the workforce and rigor through implementation science (IS) training and mentorship. Our objective is to review IS training opportunities for HIV-focused researchers and describe the approach and lessons learned from a recent HIV-related implementation research training ...
Sheree R. Schwartz +10 more
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Implementation Exchange: Implementing Implementation Research
Interfaces, 1982For some time we have been concerned with the problems of putting management science into practice and how this can best be done. We and others have looked at the meaning of implementation and sought for the factors and methods which make it successful.
Randall L. Schultz, Dennis P. Slevin
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Review of Economic Design, 2002
There may be many game forms that implement a particular social choice correspondence under Nash equilibrium; some of these game forms may produce undesirable outcomes when viewed against other criteria. The authors introduce a concept of constitutional implementation to capture these ideas of socially desirable outcomes.
Peleg, B., Winter, E.
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There may be many game forms that implement a particular social choice correspondence under Nash equilibrium; some of these game forms may produce undesirable outcomes when viewed against other criteria. The authors introduce a concept of constitutional implementation to capture these ideas of socially desirable outcomes.
Peleg, B., Winter, E.
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Econometrica, 1991
Summary: The subject of this paper is the decentralization of decision making when agents have information which is incomplete and possibly exclusive. The first theorem states that in economic environments with three or more individuals, there exists a mechanism whose Bayesian equilibria coincide with a desired collection of social choice functions if ...
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Summary: The subject of this paper is the decentralization of decision making when agents have information which is incomplete and possibly exclusive. The first theorem states that in economic environments with three or more individuals, there exists a mechanism whose Bayesian equilibria coincide with a desired collection of social choice functions if ...
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, 2015 We prove that a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if and only if it is dynamically monotonic when the number of agents is at least three. We show how to test dynamic monotonicity by building an associated repeated game. It follows that a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient among the social choice functions
Azacis, Helmuts, Vida, Péter
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Nursing Management, 2007
If you have you been involved in implementing National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance in your workplace, you can share your experiences on a new online database.
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If you have you been involved in implementing National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance in your workplace, you can share your experiences on a new online database.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Tang, Rui, Zhang, Mu
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Tang, Rui, Zhang, Mu
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Journal of Economic Theory, 1994
The basic features of this paper on implementation are the following: first, the social choice functions take their values in a space of lotteries; second, small fines may be levied on players. The solution concept is the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Abreu, Dilip, Matsushima, Hitoshi
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The basic features of this paper on implementation are the following: first, the social choice functions take their values in a space of lotteries; second, small fines may be levied on players. The solution concept is the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Abreu, Dilip, Matsushima, Hitoshi
openaire +2 more sources