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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World
, 2007 Allan M. Feldman, Roberto Serrano
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Crisis, 2012
Background: Suicide has a devastating impact on both survivors and society, and many obstacles to improving prevention efforts stem from our inadequate understanding of suicidality. A potential source of this shortcoming is that the majority of empirical studies focus only on a single specified etiology of suicide. Aims: To address this limitation, we
Nora, Bunford, Raymond M, Bergner
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Background: Suicide has a devastating impact on both survivors and society, and many obstacles to improving prevention efforts stem from our inadequate understanding of suicidality. A potential source of this shortcoming is that the majority of empirical studies focus only on a single specified etiology of suicide. Aims: To address this limitation, we
Nora, Bunford, Raymond M, Bergner
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2012
Impossible worlds constitute an increasingly popular yet controversial topic in logic and metaphysics. The term “impossible worlds” parallels the term “possible worlds” and commonly refers to setups, situations, or totalities (“worlds”) that are inconsistent, incomplete, non-classical, or non-normal in possible-world semantics and metaphysics.
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Impossible worlds constitute an increasingly popular yet controversial topic in logic and metaphysics. The term “impossible worlds” parallels the term “possible worlds” and commonly refers to setups, situations, or totalities (“worlds”) that are inconsistent, incomplete, non-classical, or non-normal in possible-world semantics and metaphysics.
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Impossible possible worlds vindicated
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1975It has often been claimed that the by now familiar possible-two rids analysis of propositional attitudes like knowledge and belief which I have advocated since 1962 is unrealistic,1 if not downright mistaken, because it apparently commits us to the assumption of logical omniscience, that is, to the assumption that everyone knows all the logical ...
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Philosophical Studies, 2012
In this paper, I argue for a particular conception of impossible worlds. Possible worlds, as traditionally understood, can be used in the analysis of propositions, the content of belief, the truth of counterfactuals, and so on. Yet possible worlds are not capable of differentiating propositions that are necessarily equivalent, making sense of the ...
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In this paper, I argue for a particular conception of impossible worlds. Possible worlds, as traditionally understood, can be used in the analysis of propositions, the content of belief, the truth of counterfactuals, and so on. Yet possible worlds are not capable of differentiating propositions that are necessarily equivalent, making sense of the ...
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2005
Abstract It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things.
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Abstract It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things.
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Why children prefer impossible worlds
Lingue e linguaggio, 2013Sentences with more than one logic operator are in principle ambiguous between different interpretations, depending on the assignment of LOGIC SCOPE This aspect, largely overlooked in previous studies, could provide the right distinction that we need to capture children's early misinterpretation of epistemic negative sentences.
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The Impossibility of ‘Possible’ Worlds
Philosophy, 1999The gist of these objections to the possible world account of necessity is that, for it to be true, ‘possible’ would have to be a name for an attribute. But to say that something is possible is not to describe it, but to say that there could be such a thing. And possibilities are not classes of entities. Possible worlds have been described as ways, but
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Counterpossibles and the nature of impossible worlds
SATS, 2016AbstractOne well-known objection to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals is that it delivers counterintuitive semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles (counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents).
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