Results 11 to 20 of about 104,584 (263)

Adaptive Incentive Design [PDF]

open access: yesIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2021
We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the process by which the strategic agents make decisions. Under the assumption that the agents are utility maximizers,
Lillian J. Ratliff, Tanner Fiez
openaire   +3 more sources

On the Complexity of Sequential Incentive Design [PDF]

open access: yesIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2022
In many scenarios, a principal dynamically interacts with an agent and offers a sequence of incentives to align the agent's behavior with a desired objective. This paper focuses on the problem of synthesizing an incentive sequence that, once offered, induces the desired agent behavior even when the agent's intrinsic motivation is unknown to the ...
Yagiz Savas   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Multiprincipals Multiagents Incentive Design [PDF]

open access: yesReview of Economic Design, 2000
This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple non-cooperatively acting principals.
Kerschbamer, R., Koray, S.
openaire   +2 more sources

Designing user incentives for cybersecurity [PDF]

open access: yesCommunications of the ACM, 2014
How to encourage better user security practices and ...
August, Terrence   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Designing incentives for Boolean games

open access: yesInternational Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2011
Boolean games are a natural, compact, and expressive class of logic-based games, in which each player exercises unique control over some set of Boolean variables, and has some logical goal formula that it desires to be achieved. A player's strategy set is the set of all possible valuations that may be made to its variables.
Endriss, U.   +3 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design [PDF]

open access: yesProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes to evaluate two marketing agents in terms of their efficacy in viral marketing, and assign a contract to the ...
Panos Toulis   +3 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Incentives for Crypto-Collateralized Digital Assets

open access: yesProceedings, 2019
Digital currencies such as Bitcoin frequently suffer from high price volatility, limiting their utility as a means of purchasing power. Hence, a popular topic among cryptocurrency researchers is a digital currency design which inherits the ...
Philip N. Brown
doaj   +1 more source

The Design of Incentive Mechanism for Policy-Oriented Guarantee Institutions’ Digital Transformation in China

open access: yesDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2022
Currently, China is actively promoting the reform process of the digital economy, and the digital transformation of the credit financing guarantee sector is gradually emerging.
Youqing Lv   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Incentive Design for Ridesharing with Uncertainty

open access: yesCoRR, 2015
13 ...
Dengji Zhao   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Designing and using incentives to support recruitment and retention in clinical trials: a scoping review and a checklist for design

open access: yesTrials, 2019
Background Recruitment and retention of participants are both critical for the success of trials, yet both remain significant problems. The use of incentives to target participants and trial staff has been proposed as one solution.
Beth Parkinson   +10 more
doaj   +1 more source

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