Results 21 to 30 of about 104,584 (263)

Incentive-Centered Design for Security [PDF]

open access: yesIEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, 2009
Security problems are incentives problems: we build defenses because people want to do things that (intentionally or inadvertently) cause harm. Yet, much research disregards systematic study of the motivations of smart, responsive, autonomous humans in the loop. Meanwhile, the maturing sciences of motivated behavior offer a growing body of theoretical,
openaire   +2 more sources

Organizational Design: Culture and Incentives

open access: yes, 2021
Why do some organizations perform so much better than others, and often persistently so? While the economics literature traditionally emphasizes the importance of incentives, other social sciences focus on the role of organizational culture. Yet very little is known about how an organization's incentive structure and its culture jointly shapes its ...
openaire   +4 more sources

Dynamic Incentive Design in Public Transit Subsidization Under Double Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Approach

open access: yesSystems
Public transit subsidization often suffers from a double (or bilateral) moral hazard problem, where both regulators and operators may reduce their efforts due to information asymmetry, thereby compromising service quality despite significant public ...
Xuli Wen, Xin Chen, Yue Fei
doaj   +1 more source

Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing-Based Indoor Localization

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2018
Wi-Fi-based indoor localization system needs to construct a radio map by site surveys. The process of site surveys is time-consuming and crowdsourcing is one feasible option to tackle this issue. Meanwhile, privacy protection has drawn concerns from both
Wei Li   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Incentive Design With Spillovers

open access: yesProceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging methods from network games. The main results characterize the optimal allocation of incentive pay across agents and
Krishna Dasaratha   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Incentives, Information, and Organizational Design [PDF]

open access: yesEmpirica, 1989
Most economic activity -- and almost all production -- takes place within the context of organizations: Firms, family, and government. In each, there is a large element of collective decision-making. Our mixed attitudes towards this collective decision-making are reflected by a number of popular aphorisms and jokes: While we may claim that "two heads ...
openaire   +3 more sources

The architecture of blockchain value: capabilities, pillars, and growth dynamics

open access: yesFrontiers in Blockchain
This paper develops a capability-based framework for understanding the architecture and value of blockchain systems. We classify networks into three paradigms: single-capability systems that deliver one core function, multi-capability systems that ...
Agisilaos Papadogiannis
doaj   +1 more source

Sales force compensation and incentive schemes: Practices in the South African pharmaceutical industry

open access: yesSouth African Journal of Business Management, 1999
Compensation plans that incorporate incentive schemes act as a sales force motivator. This study deals with sales force compensation plans from a management perspective, in the South African pharmaceutical industry.
Russell Abratt, Manfred Klein
doaj   +1 more source

Research on Distributed Incentive Architecture Based on Blockchain

open access: yes工程科学与技术, 2021
In order to solve the problem of authority deception or lacking of trust in the incentive mechanisms, the blockchain technology is used due to its decentralization, openness, immutable and anonymity.
Yunhua HE   +5 more
doaj  

Incentive Design for Rational Agents

open access: yesProceedings of the TwentyFirst International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
We introduce Incentive Design: a new class of problems for equilibrium verification in multi-agent systems. In our model, agents attempt to maximize their utility functions, which are expressed as formulae in LTL[F], a quantitative extension of Linear Temporal Logic with functions computable in polynomial time.
David Hyland   +4 more
openaire   +5 more sources

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