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Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Review of Economic Studies, 1999zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean
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Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard
Operational Research, 2020Linear contracts and their variants are quite popular in practice, for example, salesforce incentives and chief executive officer compensation. However, agency theory typically stipulates complex contract forms.
Yimin Yu, Xiangyi Kong
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2002
Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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Parties to lending agreements can create priority rankings in two ways: by securing a lender or by protecting the lender's debt with financial covenants. Protected debt turns into high priority debt because the early lender will permit covenant violations only if a later lender agrees to subordinate its claim. The Bankruptcy Code sustains both forms of
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2018
Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of ...
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Incomplete Contracting in Strategic Alliances
2014Abstract Though incomplete contracts have generally been viewed as inefficient governance mechanisms in strategic alliances, recent contributions suggest that incomplete contracts are conducive to innovation. By integrating transaction cost economics (TCE) and agency theory (AT) we shed light on this contradiction by stating what ...
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Incomplete Contracting and the Design of Constitutions
2016The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling.
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Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
1991Abstract “The Nature of the Firm” (together with Coase’s later paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”) has had an enormous influence on the development of research in the theory of organization, even if for a long time it was, in Coase’s words, “much cited and little used.” The situation has changed in the last ten to fifteen years ...
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Incomplete Contracts, Risk, and Ownership
International Economic Review, 1995This paper develops a model of ownership based on incomplete contracts, specific investments, and risk and tests the model using data on industrial subcontracting in Mexico. The choice of ownership structure involves a trade-off between minimizing holdup risk and spreading natural risk.
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Incomplete contracts and privatization
European Economic Review, 1996The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency.
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Taxation and Incomplete Contracts [PDF]
, 2012 This paper analyzes the impact of taxation on economic efficiency when contracts are incomplete, firms operate in a perfect competitive market and can choose between integrated or non-integrated governance to cope with contract incompleteness. Taxation reduces incentives to pursue intrafirm coordination, thus the efficiency of firm’s production process
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